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MINISTRY OF TRUTH: WHY LAW CAN’T STOP
PREVARICATIONS, BULLSHIT, AND STRAIGHT-OUT
LIES IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS
Catherine J. Ross*
The distinction between truth and falsehood in politics is
much in the news these days. Candidates and office holders—
from water district board members like Xavier Alvarez (of
United States v. Alvarez1) to President Donald Trump—are factchecked, awarded Pinocchios, and sometimes indicted, for halftruths, untruths, and fantastical fabrications. Many observers
fear there is an increasing disconnect between verifiable facts
and political discourse, a lack of embarrassment about even
complete fabrication, and a divide between voters who appear
to be operating based on completely different sets of “facts.”
Lies in politics and political campaigns are nothing new.
Neither are efforts to rein them in. Legislators and citizens
insist “something must be done” to curtail the most egregious
abuses. However, any government-directed effort to restrain
deception in campaign speech by candidates or their supporters
faces constitutional obstacles that appear to be insurmountable.
This Article analyzes lies during electoral campaigns,2
legislative fixes that have been enacted, and the constitutional
obstacles to such regulation. Part I provides a brief historical
introduction to the problem. Part II proposes a taxonomy of the
kinds of lies that arise during political campaigns. Part III
reviews federal and state statutes that regulate campaign
falsehoods. In Part IV, I demonstrate the First Amendment
infirmities of campaign falsehood statutes. Part V presents a
case study that reveals the difficulty of reaching agreement on
what constitutes a verifiable lie. In concluding, Part VI briefly
considers whether recent developments in technology, social
media, and culture require modifications of First Amendment
doctrine in order to ensure informed voting.
*

Fred C. Stevenson Research Professor of Law, George Washington University Law
School. The author thanks the George Washington University Law School and Dean
Blake Morant for institutional support, reference librarian Mary Kate Hunter for her
valued help, and Abigail Yull (J.D. expected 2017) for exceptional research
assistance.
1
567 U.S. 709, 713–14 (2012).
2
The lies I am concerned with here include deceptive speech about candidates, their
records and substantive issues on the ballot or pertinent to a candidacy. I have
excluded lies designed to discourage or interfere with voting, such as lies about when
and where to vote, which raise distinct issues. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, A
Constitutional Right to Lie in Campaigns and Elections?, 74 MONT. L. REV. 53, 72–73
(2013).
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ELECTION LIES
The election of 2016 was hardly the first time that
observers lamented widespread falsehoods in campaigns and
the risks that such falsehoods would not be adequately
addressed in time to enable voters to make well-informed
decisions. The problem manifested itself during the first
contested presidential election in 1796.3 The country had
quickly divided into two parties, with the Federalists supporting
the John Adams/Thomas Pinckney ticket against the
Democratic-Republicans’ slate of Thomas Jefferson and Aaron
Burr.
The 1796 election gave rise to the first documented
outright lie—“a false statement of fact”—in Boston’s
Independent Chronicle.4 The paper alleged that presidential
candidate John Adams had secretly conspired to remove
Washington as the commanding general of the revolutionary
forces, even though the conspirator had actually been his
second cousin Sam Adams.5 Other “varieties of innuendo,
distortion and falsehood,” as one chronicler has dubbed them,
in that first election included unfounded charges that Adams
was variously pro-British or pro-French and, on the other side,
that Jefferson was a drunkard, an illegitimate, interracial child,
and, horrors, a “philosopher,” as well as a supporter of the
French Jacobins (the equivalent of being a card-carrying
communist in the 1950s).6
The cross-charges continued when the candidates
opposed each other again four years later in a campaign that
has received more historical attention for its rancor, including
allegations that Jefferson was so depraved (as an atheist who
had spent time in libertine France) that his election would lead
to “a national orgy of rape, incest, and adultery.”7
The record of political lies in presidential races
continued—and countless lies that were less well documented
doubtless entered other electoral contests at every level of
government—with what the leading account of political
deception in politics has labelled “spectacularly dirty” races in
“Jackson’s first election, Lincoln’s second, the Hayes-Tilden
debacle, and Cleveland’s first election” as well as the “HooverSmith clash of 1928” and Franklin Roosevelt’s third and last
3

BRUCE L. FELKNOR, DIRTY POLITICS 18–19 (1966).
Id. at 18.
5
Id. at 19.
6
Id.; see also Jed Shugerman, The Golden or Bronze Age of Judicial Selection?, 100 IOWA
L. REV. BULL. 69 (2015) (on the election of 1800).
7
FELKNOR, supra note 3, at 21.
4
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campaign.8 But all of that was nothing, argued Bruce Felknor,
the long-time executive director of the Fair Campaign Practices
Committee, a non-partisan public interest group, and author of
the leading account of deception in presidential campaigns,
when compared to the “shrill and frenzied” attacks on
presidential candidates and Presidents that took off beginning
in the middle of the twentieth century.9
During each of the last few election cycles,
commentators have lamented new lows (or heights) of
deception. The apparent trend took off in 2004 with the
swiftboating ad campaign a political action committee directed
at John Kerry for which President George W. Bush could
disclaim responsibility.10 Observers of the 2012 presidential
contest accused Mitt Romney’s campaign of “a special level of
shamelessness in its ads and attacks,” including taking
President Obama’s quotes out of context “to portray the
president as having said things he flatly didn’t say,” and
running against things that never happened (like a purported
elimination of the work requirement for welfare recipients).11
By the 2016 election cycle, the Pulitzer Prize-winning website
Politifact awarded its 2015 annual distinction “Lie of the Year”
to the collective “campaign misstatements of Donald Trump,”
based on “inaccurate statistics and dubious accounts of his own
records and words” that “exhibited range, boldness and a
blatant disregard for truth.” 12
8

Id. at 40.
Id. at 41 (“Treason” would become a “constant campaign issue.”).
10
Elisabeth Bumiller, The 2004 Campaign: Vietnam Record; Lawyer for Bush Quits Over
Links to Kerry’s Foes, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2004)
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/26/us/2004-campaign-vietnam-record-lawyerfor-bush-quits-over-links-kerry-s-foes.html. Benjamin Ginsberg, counsel to the Bush
campaign resigned after disclosures that he had advised the veterans’ group that
made “unsubstantiated attacks” on the war record of John Kerry who had been
awarded “three Purple Hearts, a Silver Star and a Bronze Star” for his bravery in
Vietnam). Id. The term “swiftboat” has entered popular discourse in the U.S. as
meaning to “[t]arget (a politician or public figure) with a campaign of personal
attacks.” Swift-boat, OXFORD DICTIONARY,
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/swift-boat (last visited Mar. 11,
2018). In addition, according to the Political Dictionary, the smear is “untrue or
unfair.” Swiftboating, POLITICAL DICTIONARY,
http://politicaldictionary.com/words/swiftboating/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2018).
For a more recent example of swiftboating, see Amy Chozick & Ashley Parker,
Donald Trump’s Gender-Based Attacks on Hillary Clinton Have Calculated Risk, N.Y.
TIMES (April 28, 2016) (noting that Donald Trump was swiftboating Hillary Clinton
“by throwing shade on what should be a strength”).
11
Robert Schlesinger, Lies, Damned Lies, and Mitt Romney’s Ads: A New Level of
Shamelessness in Campaigns, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 8, 2012, 11:47 AM),
https://www.Usnews.com/opinion/blogs/Robert-schlesinger/2012/08/08/liesdamned-lies-and-mitt-romneys-ads.
12
Lauren Carroll and Linda Qiu, Looking Back at Lie of the Year, POLITIFACT (Dec.
13, 2016, 5:28 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-ometer/article/2016/dec/13/looking-back-lie-year/ (noting that all of the contenders
9
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II. A TAXONOMY OF CAMPAIGN FALSEHOOD
Most definitions of lying begin with the proposition that
the speaker “says something she does not believe to be true.”13
Beyond that, the lying speaker wants the listener to accept the
falsehood she proposes as truth.14
The variety of kinds and degrees of lies exacerbates the
definitional and drafting problems that arise from any effort to
regulate deception in political campaigns. This Part proposes a
taxonomy of the varieties of lies, and establishes the
definitional, volitional, and materiality issues they raise,
showing that it is difficult if not impossible to address the
permutations of campaign lies through statutory language or
common law, even before adding constitutional considerations
to the analysis. In this framework, the expression of those who
support one side in a campaign is generally attributable to the
candidate.
A. Straight-out lies: (A) self-referential and (B) oppositional
The first and simplest category is what the plurality in
United States v. Alvarez labeled the “straight[-]out lie.”15 The
straight-out lie states a verifiable fact that is easily confirmed or
refuted. It is a knowing falsehood, resolving any issue of mens
rea—“an intended, undoubted lie,” about which there is no
room to argue about interpretation or shades of meaning.16
I start with the straight-out lie told by the candidate or
his supporters about the candidate, not about his or her
opponent. The straight-out lie about oneself (or the candidate
the speaker supports), which I shall call the “self-referential
straight-out lie,” concerns a simple fact that the candidate
personally knows is either true or false. For example, in Xavier
Alvarez’s case, the claim was that he received a Medal of
Honor, but he was never actually awarded one.17 However,
for 2015 were Trump’s and he scored 76% Mostly False, False or Pants on Fire,
more than any other politician). In the first 100 days, Trump as President averaged
five lies a day. See Charles L. Blow, In Defense of the Truth, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/04/opinion/trump-truth-wiretappingobama.html. Trump received the dubious honor of winning PolitiFact’s Lie of the
Year again, at the end of 2017, for his repeated assertions that Russian interference in
the 2016 elections was a “made-up-story.” Angie Drobnic Holan, 2017 Lie of the
Year: Russian Election Interference is a ‘Made-Up-Story’, POLITIFACT (Dec. 12, 2017,
6:30 AM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2017/dec/12/2017-lieyear-russian-election-interference-made-s/.
13
SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY, AND THE
LAW 13 (2014); see also SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE LIFE 13 (1989).
14
E.g., BOK, supra note 13, at 13.
15
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 727 (2012) (plurality opinion).
16
Id. at 715.
17
Id. at 709.
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Alvarez’s lie was not voiced during a campaign.18 Although
Alvarez held a very minor public office—he had recently been
elected a member of the local water district board when he
falsely claimed to be a military hero—the Court noted that he
did not lie until after the election and could not have hoped to
garner votes from his deception.19 As discussed more fully in
Part IV below, the Court held that the First Amendment
extended to Alvarez’s false claim.20
Other easily verified facts about oneself include, “I am
the incumbent,” which, as discussed below, the state may or
may not be able to regulate even if it is not strictly true
depending on exactly how the claim is phrased.21
The bald-faced lie is often referred to in conversation as
claiming, “up is down” or “black is white.” I instead use the
analogy “blue is yellow,” a more accurate reference to opposite
or complementary pigments on the color wheel which do not
share any pigmentation.
A closely related but modestly distinguishable category
involves the straight-out lie about an opponent, which I
designate the “oppositional straight-out lie”: “she is not the
incumbent, though she calls herself ‘Congresswoman’;”22 “he is
on the list of convicted sex offenders;” or “he is ineligible for
the presidency because he was born in Kenya.”23 Again, each of
these is easily verified or refuted with only a little bit of digging,
either by the speaker or, in the age of online research, arguably
by voters themselves. Citizens can determine who is the actual
incumbent with a minimum of effort; check with the police to
find the list of sex offenders; and, arguably, determine from
news sources where the candidate was born, at least if the
internet is not full of fake news or alternative facts.

18

Id. at 713–14 (explaining that the lie was told at his first board meeting as an
already elected board member).
19
Id. at 714. (“The statements do not seem to have been made to secure employment
or financial benefits or admission to privileges reserved for those who had earned the
Medal.”).
20
Id. Alvarez made his untrue claim at the first public meeting of the Three Valley
Water District Board he attended after being elected, apparently in “a pathetic
attempt to gain respect that eluded him, not to obtain any benefit. Id. Presumably,
winning the election might be construed as securing employment or other benefit.
See Commonwealth v. Lucas, 34 N.E.3d 1242, 1253 (Mass. 2015) (concluding that if
a candidate made Alvarez’s false claim “at a preelection debate,” then Alvarez
inoculates the candidate from criminal prosecution).
21
See, e.g., Cook v. Corbett, 446 P.2d 179, 182–83 (Or. 1968).
22
Id. at 183–85 (holding that a candidate who was not an incumbent violated the
false campaign speech statute by urging voters to “re-elect” her).
23
See Lily Rothman, This Is How the Whole Birther Thing Actually Started, TIME (Sept.
16, 2016), http://time.com/4496792/birther-rumor-started/ (explaining the
beginnings of the “birther” conspiracy theory about President Obama, which alleged
that he was born in Kenya—not the United States).
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B. Intentional Distortions
The second category of deceptions is composed of what
I call “intentional distortions,” misleading but not strictly
untrue statements about the record of either the candidate or
the candidate’s opponent. Here, prevarication extends beyond
biographical particulars to embrace disputes over policy issues,
including ballot referenda.24 These come in at least two classic
forms. In the first, “false claims of credit,” the candidate who is
speaking, say, running for re-election as governor, campaigns
based on support for a popular measure he signed into law—
although he opposed the measure when the legislature
considered it, and it passed again with a veto-proof majority. In
the second scenario, which I label “contextual distortion,” the
distortion arises from the willful failure to disaggregate multiple
issues that have been artificially compacted, as with omnibus
legislation. For example, a candidate who opposes so-called
“pork” might nonetheless vote to approve the annual budget,
even though it is filled with lard, and then be accused of voting
for pork barrel spending. An incumbent who has long been
vociferous about her opposition to abortion may be accused of
voting to support “taxpayer-funded abortion” because she voted
for a broad health insurance bill that incidentally allowed
funding for abortions. 25
C. Hyperbole
Beyond straight-out lies about the speaker and the
opponent, and intentional distortions, a third category of
campaign falsehood involves hyperbole. Hyperbole and similar
rhetorical devices (including satire and parody, which I am
rolling into the term hyperbole here) may not fit the definition
of lying at all because the speaker does not offer the statement
as truthful, much less verifiable, and does not expect any
reasonable listener to believe it, or to rely on it.26 Falsehoods
24

See 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 766 F.3d 774, 785, 788 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding
that Minnesota’s Fair Campaign Practices Act, which made it a crime to knowingly
or with reckless disregard for the truth make a false statement about a proposed
ballot initiative, failed strict scrutiny as it was “simultaneously overbroad and
underinclusive”).
25
See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 U.S. 2334 (2014) (holding that
plaintiffs had standing to challenge Ohio’s false statement act under which the state’s
Elections Commission found probable cause of a violation based on a proposed
billboard that would have proclaimed “Shame on Steve Driehaus! Driehaus voted
FOR taxpayer-funded abortion” without mentioning that the vote was for the
Affordable Care Act); see also Lucas, 34 N.E.3d at 1256 (“Assertions regarding a
candidate’s voting record on a particular issue may very well require an in-depth
analysis of legislative history that will often be ill-suited to the compressed time
frame of an election.”).
26
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 49 (1988) (explaining that even the
most repugnant allegations are not actionable if they “could not reasonably have
been interpreted as stating actual facts”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
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that hold out no pretense of being factual or truthful don’t need
to be unmasked. The marketplace they enter immediately
discounts their contribution, at least as far as facts are
concerned.27
Hyperbole may include vigorous and hurtful epithets:
liar, blackmailer, pimp, accomplice to murder.28 If not capable
of being seen as “reasonably implying false and defamatory
facts,” hyperbole is not actionable in lawsuits for defamation,
and presumably is beyond regulation as political deception for
similar reasons.29 Hyperbole may also embrace exaggeration of
the speaker’s successes, like a record of “bests.”30
581A (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (providing a clear example in the law of defamation
where two extremes provide defenses—one complete defense to a suit for defamation
being truth).
27
Catherine J. Ross, Incredible Lies, 89 U. of Colorado L. Rev. 101 (forthcoming
2018) (discussing hyperbole and other statements not offered for their truth in the
context of defamation and fortune-telling).
28
See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 2 (1990) (holding that simply
stating “Jones is a liar—in terms of opinion—‘In my opinion Jones is a liar’—does
not dispel the factual implications contained in the statement”); Greenbelt Coop.
Publ’g Ass’n v. Bressler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970) (stating that “blackmail” referred to a
tough negotiation stance, not a crime); Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1079 (9th
Cir. 2005) (holding that a “reasonable person would not construe caption under
photo on website as charging celebrity with being pimp or that wife was prostitute, as
required to establish defamation”); Horsley v. Rivera, 292 F.3d 695, 696, 702 (11th
Cir. 2002) (holding that talk show host comments that an “anti-abortion activist was
‘an accomplice to murder’” was “non-literal rhetorical hyperbole”); Troy Group, Inc.
v. Tilson, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1156 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (discussing hypotheticals and
holding “crook,” in context, to be “colloquial, exaggerated, and non-literal”).
Absent a showing of malice, the “rhetorical hyperbole often present in vehement
debate” and the “misstatements and misrepresentations ordinarily associated with
the political milieu” are “rhetorical hyperbole” and not actionable as defamation.
Herbert v. Okla. Christian Coal., 992 P.2d 322, 332 (Okla. 1999) (citing Greenbelt
Coop. Publ’g Ass’n, 398 U.S. at 10–11). But an accusation of criminal activity may
constitute defamation if stated as fact during a political campaign. See Newman v.
Delahunty, 681 A.2d 671, 680, 683 (N.J. 1994) (holding that a news story headlined
“Newman’s thugs attack senior citizen” and complaining about taxes and corruption
was defamatory statement of fact, actionable if actual malice was shown, and
distinguishable from cartoons making similar points because cartoons are “ordinarily
understood” to “be rhetorical, exaggerated means of expressing opinions.”); see also
Celebrezze v. Dayton Newspapers, Inc., 535 N.E.2d 755, 758 (Ohio 1988) (holding
that a cartoon during a reelection campaign that depicted a judge as a murderer was
clearly “exaggeration, hyperbole,” comparable to a cartoon depicting the city
“council as a prostitute willing to sell her favors”).
29
See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 2 (holding that “statements that cannot reasonably be
interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual are protected”).
30
Lauren Carroll, The 10 Biggest Falsehoods From the Year of Trump, POLITIFACT (June
16, 2016, 8:43 AM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-ometer/article/2016/jun/16/10-biggest-falsehoods-year-trump/ (Trump “oversold his
personal successes,” citing misleading references to the “largest” winery “on the East
Coast,” “the best-selling business book of all time,” and the claim the Trump
University received an A grade from the Better Business Bureau” six months before
he paid $25 million to settle a lawsuit by defrauded students); see also Judge Approves
$25 Million Settlement Of Trump University Lawsuit, NPR (Mar. 31, 2017, 1:51 PM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/03/31/522199535/judgeapproves-25-million-settlement-of-trump-university-lawsuit (Trump paid $25 million
to settle a lawsuit by defrauded students).
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But liars often claim after the fact and without
justification that their statements were intended as “jokes,”31
hyperbole, or parody. This category of speech is not a get out of
jail free card. The humor or exaggeration must be readily
apparent for the hyperbole defense to be sustainable.32
If the speaker has no concern about the truth or
falsehood of what she is saying, as philosopher Harry Frankfurt
has pointed out, she may just be “bullshitting,” a different form
of speech than hyperbole, but sharing the attribute that no lie is
intended.33 “Lack of . . . concern with truth —[an] indifference
to how things really are,” Frankfort tells us, is “of the essence of
bullshit.”34 Both hyperbole and bullshit, if recognizable as such,
fall within the domain of expression I have argued elsewhere
the law protects precisely because it is so out of bounds that no
reasonable person would believe it.35 Its absurdity renders it
harmless to the recipient and materially worthless to the
speaker.36
D. Indirect Prevarication
The fourth variety of campaign lies in many ways poses
the most difficult definitional dilemma: it is neither an outright
fabrication, nor a matter of omitting context that helps to
explain what happened and why, but rather a situation in
which key facts and outcomes can be read in different ways and
easily exploited by the sly speaker. Let’s return to the color
circle. Imagine that observers, asked to label each pigment as a
primary color, are told to assign labels to purple. They might
choose red or blue—both choices would be arguably correct or
incorrect. This category is not intended to embrace conclusions
about which reasonable minds may differ, but rather is
designed to incorporate the sleight of tongue, which I call
“indirect prevarication,”—falsehoods the speaker can
disingenuously deny.

31

Chris Cillizza, Donald Trump Likes to ‘Joke’ About a Lot of Things That Aren’t Funny,
CNN: THE POINT (Aug. 1, 2017, 4:25 PM),
www.cnn.com/2017/08/01/politics/trump-joking-police/index.html (White House
says the President was “just joking” when he urged police officers to rough up
suspects, urged supporters to “knock the hell” out of protesters at rallies, and called
on Russia to hack more of the Clinton campaign’s emails.).
32
In re O’Callaghan, 796 S.E.2d 604, 625–26 (W. Va. 2017) (rejecting a judicial
candidate’s claim that his misleading campaign flyer was a parody or alternatively
rhetorical hyperbole).
33
HARRY G. FRANKFURT, ON BULLSHIT 61 (2005).
34
Id. at 33–34.
35
Ross, supra note 27.
36
Id.
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Push polling questions provide a perfect example of
deniable indirect prevarication.37 During the 2000 South
Carolina Republican primary, for example, push pollers
working for the Bush campaign suggested that John McCain
had “fathered an illegitimate black child.”38 Recurring forms of
questions whose verifiability can be denied include, “Did you
know . . . ?” and “Would it change your opinion if you knew . .
. ?”39
The subtlest of distinctions may prove dispositive in an
assessment of whether claims are true or false. In two cases
decided one year apart, the highest court in Oregon held first
that the ubiquitous campaign slogan “Re-elect” used in a
primary by a challenger to the actual incumbent constituted a
deliberate material falsehood, “intended to create the belief in
the reader” that the candidate, referred to as “Senator Corbett,”
was the incumbent, even though her term in office had expired
the previous year.40
The very next year, the same court held that a candidate
for county commissioner did not make false claims to
incumbency by using the slogan “Return a proven leader,”
despite the possible inference that the candidate currently held a
public office, possibly even the one up for grabs in the pending
election.41 The court reasoned that the candidate had once
served as sheriff, and could claim to be “a veteran in
government.”42 An intentionally ambiguous statement,
susceptible to a truthful interpretation, may be treated as
truthful no matter how many voters it misleads.43 Or perhaps
not, in the hands of a different court or with a slight twist on the
facts. And whether a candidate is regarded as “a proven leader”
37

Push polls purport to be neutral opinion polls but are in fact acting on behalf of a
campaign. See N.H. Att’y Gen. v. Bass Victory Comm., 104 A.3d 181, 184 (N.H.
2014). The questions commonly include inferences and misinformation. See id. at
184 (noting that the statute under review defined push polling as “[a]sking questions
related to opposing candidates for public office which state, imply, or convey
information about the candidates [sic] character, status, or political stance or
record.”).
38
News Shrink, McCain’s Revenge, DAILY BEAST (Nov. 5, 2008, 7:16 AM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/mccains-revenge?source=dictionary.
39
Frederick F. Schauer, Language, Truth and the First Amendment: An Essay in Memory
of Harry Canter, 64 VA. L. REV. 263, 297 (1978) (explaining that statements that can
be tested are “susceptible to verification and thus may be characterized as true or
false with some degree of certainty”).
40
See Cook v. Corbett, 446 P.2d 179, 179 (Or. 1968). See also United States v.
Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 738 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring) (upholding, against a First
Amendment challenge, a statute prohibiting campaign materials falsely claiming that
the candidate is an incumbent).
41
Mosee v. Clark, 453 P.2d 176, 177 (Or. 1969).
42
Id. at 178.
43
Id. (“Ambiguity may be just cause for criticism in political debate, but it is not a
statutory ground for forfeiting an election.”).
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was a matter of opinion, immune to regulation.44 Perhaps it
also matters whether the indirect prevarication is contained in
an off-the-cuff remark, voiced in casual conversation, or a
meticulously crafted evasion read from a script or incorporated
into myriad campaign materials.
1. Opinion distinguished.
Indirect prevarication can be difficult to distinguish from
opinion, which does not implicate verifiable facts.45 Opinions
voiced during a campaign do not amount to misleading
statements for the same reason opinions do not constitute
defamation: they are not susceptible to proof or disproof.
A 2017 fundraising email from then-Senator Al Franken
provided an apt explanation:
Minnesota hotdish is one of the most delicious
foods. Betsy DeVos is the most unqualified
cabinet nominee ever. Washington is one of the
most dysfunctional places in the country. These
are all opinions. I think they’re correct, but I’m
biased because these are my opinions. These are
not facts.46
The email continues with what Franken correctly labels
verifiable “facts”: “The FEC [fundraising] deadline is in 6 days,
and my campaign has not yet met its goal.”47
Another example involves disputes over whether a
proposed tax is “fair.”48 As one appellate panel explained,
whether a vote for a ballot measure that would impose a new
tax on a particular industry would make it pay its “fair share” is
not subject to objective verifiability. You can get
a Ph.D. in political science studying what ‘fair
shares’ are and still not come to any firm
conclusion. The subject has occupied political
philosophers since at least Aristotle . . . . It is one

44

Id. at 177.
SCHAUER, supra note 39, at 279 (highlighting the difficulty of distinguishing
between facts and opinions, stating that “[i]n between these extremes lie statements
reflecting varying degrees of inference, synthesis, and value judgment, the presence
of each making the process and possibility of verification somewhat less certain”).
46
Email from Al Franken, Senator from Minn., to author (Sept. 24, 2017) (on file
with author) (Re: “Opinions vs [sic] Facts”).
47
Id.
48
Huntington Beach City Council v. Superior Court, 94 Cal. App. 4th 1417, 1436
(Cal. App. 2002).
45
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of those topics that is particularly suited for the
marketplace of ideas.49
It is, in short, “mere opinion.”50 On the other hand, a speaker
cannot count on escaping liability for defamation by labeling a
scurrilous charge that implies knowledge of facts as “just my
opinion.”51
Do the allegations that “my opponent’s plan is likely to
destroy the budget,” or “leave hundreds homeless,” suggest
underlying facts?52 The answer may depend on whether a
factual statement appears to be embedded in hyperbole or
ambiguity that insulates it from prosecution, or whether the
speech may be construed to imply “an assertion of objective
fact.”53
Many statements present a mix of facts and opinion that
can be difficult for candidates, judges, and, presumably, voters
to disaggregate. For example, a candidate seeking reelection to
the Oregon state senate in a contested primary sued his
opponent for claiming that he had “voted against the Farm Use
Deferral.”54 On closer inquiry, it appeared that the bill the
incumbent candidate had voted against would have deprived
some current Farm Use Deferral recipients of continued
eligibility for the benefit, and thus the candidate construed his
vote “against” as a vote “for” Farm Use Deferral because of the
effect he expected his vote to have.55 An appellate court held
that “characterization of the meaning of the [candidate’s] vote”
was not a statement of fact but “in reality . . . a nonactionable
expression of opinion” under a state law regulating campaign
falsehood.56
Other courts agree that it is simply too difficult to sort
out convoluted legislative histories and the motives of
individual legislators so that statements about a candidate’s
voting record “fall within the ambit of reasonable comment on

49

Id.
Id.
51
See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 1 (1990) (holding that a “separate
constitutional privilege for ‘opinion’ was not required in addition to established
safeguards regarding defamation to ensure freedom of expression guaranteed by [the]
First Amendment”).
52
Sumner v. Bennett, 608 P.2d 566, 566 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (holding after the
election that characterization of a candidate’s voting record was opinion, “not
actionable as false statements within [the] meaning of [Oregon’s] Corrupt Practices
Act”).
53
Neumann v. Liles, 369 P.3d 1117, 1119 (Or. 2016).
54
Yes on 24-367 Comm. v. Deaton, 367 P.3d 937, 942 (Or. App. 2016).
55
Id.
56
Id. at 355.
50
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official conduct.”57 The problem is exacerbated by the
increasing use of omnibus bills to which controversial measures
are attached as amendments.58
These are just examples of what concerned the highest
court in Massachusetts when it advised: “it is much easier to
recognize the significance of the distinction between statements
of opinion and statements of fact than it is to make the
distinction in a particular case.”59
In another twist, the candidate (or a person or group
speaking on the candidate’s behalf) might repeat a rumor with
the caveat that the speaker has no idea whether the rumor is
true, as many people do in conversation. Consider these
hypotheticals:60 “someone told me that my opponent runs a
child sex ring from a pizza shop”;61 “some people say my
opponent was arrested for pedophilia”; “I saw a picture, I don’t
know if it was photo-shopped or not, indicating that my
opponent’s father was present when President Kennedy was
assassinated.”62
2. Just bullshitting.
Unlike the straight-out lie, in the examples set out
immediately above, the speaker makes no pretense of knowing
whether the allegation is true or false. If the speaker doesn’t
care about the truth of the matter, perhaps the statement is just
bullshit. But in an electoral context, we might expect the
campaign to have an obligation to perform due diligence before
repeating a rumor, because the stakes are high: “In the political
arena a false statement is more likely to make a behavioral
difference (say, by leading the listeners to vote for the
speaker).”63 Does it matter whether the rumor is already in
circulation, or whether the campaign itself originated the
57

Herbert v. Okla. Christian Coal., 992 P.2d 322, 331 (Okla. 1999) (summarizing
cases from other jurisdictions and the Kansas Supreme Court in stating, “[A]lthough
the whole truth was not stated, it seldom is in political campaigns” (citing Hein v.
Lacy, 616 P.2d 277, 286 (Kan. 1980))).
58
E.g., id. at 326 n.2 (describing a vote for a “massive bill that would have recodified
[the state’s] Criminal Code,” characterized by opponents as a vote to decriminalize
sodomy and legalize marijuana).
59
Commonwealth v. Lucas, 34 N.E.3d 1242, 1255 (Mass. 2015) (quoting King v.
Globe Newspaper Co., 512 N.E.2d 241, 244 (Mass. 1987)).
60
See generally H. Taylor Buckner, A Theory of Rumor Transmission, 29 PUB. OPINION
Q. 54 (1965).
61
See BBC Trending, The Saga of ‘Pizzagate’: The Fake Story that Shows How Conspiracy
Theories Spread, BBC (Dec. 2, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending38156985.
62
Robert Farley, Fact Check: Trump Defends Claim on Oswald and Cruz’s Father, USA
TODAY (July 23, 2016, 12:31 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/07/23/fact-checktrump-lee-harvey-oswald-rafael-cruz/87475714/.
63
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 738 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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rumor? In the latter instance, does that bring the statement into
the straight-out lie category? How about the candidate who
says: “I was just joking” but has nonetheless introduced a
rumor into the marketplace of ideas, where the falsehood may
have staying power.64
The taxonomy65 of deceptive campaign speech I have
proposed here includes (from simplest to most complex): (i)
straight-out lies, self-referential (where the speaker knows the
truth as well as anyone) or oppositional; (ii) intentional
distortions, including both false claims of credit and contextual
distortion of an opponent’s words or acts; (iii) hyperbole; and
(iv) indirect prevarication.66 Each of these categories—and the
list is not exhaustive—raises distinct issues concerning: the
speaker’s intent to mislead; how we define the statements
subsumed under the label; the harms and degree of harm the
falsehoods may cause; and whether, how, and with what ease
the statements may be verified.
The reader should keep these variations on campaign
deceptions in mind while reading Part III, which reviews
statutes that purport to contain falsehood in elections. Consider
whether the statutory language is likely to reach the vast
majority of straight-out lies, of indirect prevarications, or of the
gradations of falsehood between those two extremes.
II. REMEDIAL STATUTES
Each category in the taxonomy I have just proposed
may contain expression that under other circumstances would
be considered libelous, but actions for defamation are unlikely
to bring relief in the face of campaign lies.67 To begin with,
64

See Maria Konnikova, Trump’s Lies vs. Your Brain, POLITICO: MAGAZINE (Jan./Feb.
2017), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/01/donald-trump-lies-liareffect-brain-214658.
65
Other commentators have proposed different taxonomies focused on other aspects
of lies. See Alan K. Chen & Justin Marceau, High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First
Amendment, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1435, 1443–54 (2015) (proposing a different sort of
taxonomy for lies, one that divides falsehoods based on their social value and assigns
different levels of protection to different categories of lies). Helen Norton has
proposed a number of insightful taxonomies of lies, including one addressed
specifically to election lies. She suggests (and I agree) that the various taxonomies of
election lies, and presumably of other lies, are “by no means mutually exclusive.”
Helen Norton, (At Least) Thirteen Ways of Looking at Election Lies, 71 OKLA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018) (offering a taxonomy with numerous dimensions including the
speaker’s identity, (candidate, robot, corporation), motive (to be elected or
undermine truth), the subject matter of the lie, and the timing of the lie in relation to
election day, and arguing that the distinctions may bear on the nature and scope of
the harm election lies cause).
66
See Chen & Marceau, supra note 65, at 1443–54.
67
See Brooks Jackson, Suing Over False Political Advertising, FACTCHECK.ORG (Feb. 7,
2008), http://www.factcheck.org/2008/02/suing-over-false-political-advertising/
(“Supreme Court decisions make it extremely difficult for a public figure—especially
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neither civil nor criminal defamation actions are likely to be
resolved before the election is in a distant rearview mirror.68
More to the point for my purposes, candidates in every
election—local to national, party primary to the presidential
ballot—are public figures under defamation jurisprudence.69
The defamation rules crafted for public figures in New
York Times v. Sullivan70 apply, making it extremely difficult for a
plaintiff to prevail.71 Libel laws, numerous courts have held,
will not provide a remedy for political candidates absent a
showing of actual malice or reckless disregard for truth.72 To
the contrary, the Supreme Court expressly explained that the
“clash of reputations is the staple of election campaigns, and
damage to reputation is, of course, the essence of libel.”73 “[I]t
is by no means easy,” the Court warned, “to see what statement
about a candidate might be altogether without relevance to his
fitness for the office he seeks.”74 Relevance to the candidate’s
fitness for office appears to inoculate even the false statement
from liability.
This gap has led legislators at every level of government
to enact statutes purporting to penalize campaign lies. Efforts
may have started during the progressive era,75 well before the
Supreme Court incorporated the First Amendment through the
Fourteenth to govern state and local regulations on speech,76
and before the Court even began to interpret the meaning of the
anyone running for public office—to win a libel case even if what is said about them
is false.”).
68
Id. (“[I]t can take years for a libel case to come to trial, and so there would be no
hope of getting a court to rule until the election in question was long over.”).
69
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272–74 (1971); Harte-Hanks
Commc’ns., Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 686–88 (1989).
70
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
71
See id. at 279–280 (holding that a public figure must show that the speaker acted
“with ‘actual malice,’ that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not.”).
72
Richard L. Hasen, supra note 2, at 63.
73
Monitor Patriot Co., 401 U.S. at 275.
74
Id. at 274–75 (reserving without deciding the question of “whether there remains
some exiguous area of defamation against which a candidate [might] have . . .
recourse” and reversing and remanding where the jury was instructed to consider
whether the allegation that a candidate for office had been a “small-time bootlegger”
decades earlier was relevant to his “fitness for office” and therefore within the New
York Times standard).
75
See Jason Zenor, A Reckless Disregard for the Truth? The Constitutional Right to Lie in
Politics, 38 CAMPBELL L. REV. 41, 46 (2016) (citing Developments in the Law: Elections,
88 HARV. L. REV. 1111, 1273–79 nn. 39, 49 (1975)). The earliest campaign
falsehood statute appears to be the precursor of the Minnesota law overturned in Care
Committee v. Arneson, 766 F.3d 774 (2014), originally enacted in 1893. Five other
states appear to have enacted campaign falsehood statutes during the Progressive era:
West Virginia (1908), Oregon (1909), North Dakota (1911) (limited to prohibiting
payment to a newspaper to support or oppose a candidate for public office), Montana
(1912), and North Carolina (1913).
76
See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (containing dicta that extends
First Amendment freedom of speech guarantee to the states).
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Speech Clause.77 Watergate and the associated revelations
about events during the 1972 presidential election brought
renewed popular and legislative focus to deceptive speech in
campaigns and renewed efforts to regulate such expression lest
it undermine informed voting and democracy.78
A. Federal Responses
The scandal that unfolded after the break-in at the
Democratic National Committee’s headquarters in the
Watergate complex eventually revealed that President Nixon’s
reelection team engaged in a myriad of “dirty tricks”79 beyond
the crimes of breaking and entering, stealing records, and
covering up the initial burglary. Pressure mounted on Congress
to do something, “but do what?”80 Asked to advise
congressional leaders, distinguished constitutional scholars and
commentators warned that any “comprehensive” response that
attempted to “regulate ‘smears,’ however desirable it may
seem” would “necessarily raise First Amendment questions,”
which they did not lay out.81
Ignoring that caveat, Congress acted.
Democratic Senator Birch Bayh, who sponsored the
section of a campaign finance bill containing language designed
to rein in campaign lies which Congress adopted in 1974,
expressly recognized “the difficult problems that a broader
criminal libel statute presents in terms of [F]irst [A]mendment
guarantees.”82 He hoped to circumvent those barriers in a
narrower provision aimed at “dirty tricks.”83 The tricks, he
77

See CATHERINE J. ROSS, LESSONS IN CENSORSHIP: HOW SCHOOLS AND COURTS
SUBVERT STUDENTS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 13–16 (2015).
78
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES, HEARINGS
ON WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES, 93RD CONG., 1ST SESS., ch. 5, (1973).
79
These “tricks” were of course conduct, not speech that could even arguably be
protected as a matter of constitutional law. They included the earlier burglary of the
office of the Pentagon Paper’s leaker Daniel Ellsberg’s psychiatrist by a group that
overlapped with those who conducted the Watergate break-in, including G. Gordon
Liddy, the general counsel of the Finance Committee of the Committee to Re-Elect
the President (“CREP”). RALPH K. WINTER, JR. WATERGATE AND THE LAW:
POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER AMERICAN ENTERPRISE
INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH 14–15 (1974). For “dirty tricks,” the report
recommended restricting any legislative fix to “political espionage . . . requiring
proof of specific intent,” but noted that “the most serious activities” are already
illegal under existing law and that “there are abundant pitfalls in undertaking” an
“expansion,” including differentiating tricks from mere humorous “pranks.” Id. at
50.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 51 (discussing only the protections for anonymity extending to campaign
literature and the risk of selective prosecution). The group included Ralph Winter,
Alexander Bickel and Harry Wellington, all of Yale Law School, as well as Paul
Bator, Aaron Wildavsky and James Q. Wilson. Id.
82
120 CONG. REC. 10814 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 1974) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh).
83
Id.
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reminded his colleagues on the Senate floor, included a 1972
incident in which the Committee to Re-Elect the President
forged a letter on the stationery of Democratic Senator Edward
Muskie that “accused Senators HUMPHREY and
JACKSON,” against whom he was competing in the
Democratic presidential primary, “of the most bizarre type of
personal conduct.”84 Specifically, the unsigned letter, sent
through U.S. mail to thousands of voters, falsely alleged that
Senator Humphrey had a call girl in his car with him when he
was arrested in 1967 for drunk driving, and that Senator
Jackson had been arrested twice for homosexuality.85 Neither
Senator had been arrested, and no evidence existed that Senator
Humphrey had ever been seen with a call girl.
Bayh’s language enacted into federal law prohibitions on
falsely attributed statements in campaigns for federal office “on
a matter which is damaging to [an opposing] candidate or
political party.”86 Violations constituted felony fraud, and
penalties included imprisonment.87 The language on
84

Id. (capitalization in original).
Martin Waldron, Segretti Indicted in Mailing of Bogus Muskie Letter, N.Y. TIMES (May
5, 1973), http://www.nytimes.com/1973/05/05/archives/segretti-indicted-inmailing-of-bogus-muskie-letter-linked-to-plot.html?_r=0. Donald Segretti, an
attorney, was convicted and served four-and-a half-month sentence. John M.
Crewdson, Out of Prison a Month, Segretti Tries to Pick Up the Pieces of His Old Carefree
Life, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 1974),
http://www.nytimes.com/1974/04/22/archives/out-of-prison-a-month-segrettitries-to-pick-up-the-pieces-of-his.html. The federal statute under which Segretti was
charged reached campaign falsehoods transmitted through the United States Postal
Service or in interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988) (amended 1994); 18
U.S.C. § 612 (1970) (repealed 1976). Section 617, enacted in 1974, reached speech in
any format, whether or not it was transmitted by U.S. mail or entered interstate
commerce. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974).
The false allegations Republicans hurled at Humphrey were being lived by Wilbur
Mills, the Democratic Chair of the House Ways and Means Committee, with whom
District of Columbia police engaged in a car chase until a drunk Mills drove his car
into the Tidal Basin where he was found with his frequent companion, burlesque
performer Fanne Fox. Stephen Green & Margot Hornblower, Mills Admits Being
Present During Tidal Basin Scuffle, WASH. POST (Oct. 11,1974),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/local/longterm/tours/scandal/tidalbas.htm. The revelations that followed
ended his career. Dennis Hevesi, Wilbur Mills, Long a Power in Congress, is Dead at 82,
N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 1992), http://nytimes/com/1992/05/03/us/wilbur-mills-longa-power-in-congress-is-dead-at-82.html?pagewanted=print. Because the facts were
verifiable, political opponents remained free to exploit them even after the Federal
Election Campaign Act Amendment of 1974.
86
18 U.S.C. § 617 (Supp. 1975).
87
Id. The statute remains in place today in modified form. 52 U.S.C. § 30124(a)
(2012); 52 U.S.C. § 30109 (2012). There do not appear to be any reported cases
involving enforcement of the campaign falsehood section of the federal election laws.
Timothy J. Moran, Format Restrictions on Televised Political Advertising: Elevating
Political Debate Without Suppressing Free Speech, 67 IND. L. J. 663, 674 n.63 (1992)
(there are “no reported decisions” under 2 U.S.C. § 441(h) (1988), which prohibits
fraudulent misrepresentation by a member of a political party). The only reported
case since then, my research revealed, involved the same section. See FEC v.
85
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“damaging” to an opponent is common in state statutes aimed
at deception in politics analyzed in Part IV below.
Congress declined to adopt a competing campaign
finance statute that contained an alternative restriction on
deceptive campaign speech that would have reached more
political expression. Referred to as Section 20, the provision
would have criminalized “dirty tricks,” engaged in “with the
specific intent [to] mislead[ ] voters or disrupt[ ] a campaign”
coupled with a likelihood of success.88 It enumerated illegal
“acts,” many of which were in fact speech, making it a crime
to: (i) “convey false instructions to a campaign worker”; (ii)
“place misleading advertisements”; (iii) or “utter a false oral or
written statement concerning any material fact about a
candidate.”89
Section 20, which resembled many of the state statutes
discussed below in Part III B, was rife with First Amendment
perils, though nothing in the written record suggests they were
explored at the time.90 What, for example, constitutes a
“misleading” advertisement?91 What facts about a candidate are
“material” or, for that matter, “false”?92 Must the falsehood be
about an opposing candidate, or could it be a falsehood that
puts the candidate who is speaking or whose supporters speak
in a better light than the truth would sustain?93 All of these
issues arise in state campaign truth statutes that remain on the
books today, as Part IV demonstrates.
B. State Responses
At least sixteen states currently have laws that regulate
or criminalize false campaign speech.94 Taking all of the
Novacek, 739 F. Supp.2d 957, 959–60 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (fraudulent implication that
a telemarketer was raising funds for the Republican party).
88
120 CONG. REC. 8663 (1974) (statements of Sen. John Tower); Developments in the
Law: Elections, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1111, 1296, 1296 n.354 (1975) (questioning not the
constitutionality but “rather the wisdom of a comprehensive approach encompassing
all types of deceptive practices”).
89
120 CONG. REC. 8663 (1974).
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.095 (2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-13-109 (2015); FLA. STAT.
§ 104.271 (2015); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/29-4 (2014); LA. STAT. ANN. § 18:1463
(2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 56, § 42 (2014); MINN. STAT. § 211B.06 (2014); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 23-15-875 (2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-274(a)(7)–(8) (2015); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 16.1- 10-04 (2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.21–.22 (LexisNexis
2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 260.532 (2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-13-16 (2004);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-142 (2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-11-1103 (LexisNexis
2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2- 1005.1(A) (2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17A.335
(2014); W. VA. CODE § 3-8-11 (2013); WIS. STAT. § 12.05 (2011). These statutes were
last checked by the author in October, 2017. The Federal Election Campaign Act
does not preempt the states from regulating fraud in political advertising or, it seems,
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provisions together, they would arguably reach all of the
categories of deceptive campaign speech set out in the
taxonomy described in Part II,95 but each state leaves some
substantial categories of campaign falsehood unregulated.
Broadly, the state statutes take a number of common
approaches.
First, some statutes target false speech about an
opponent.96 Modifiers may restrict the statute’s reach to
falsehoods aimed at defeating the candidate.97 The language in
these statements, including clauses like “any statement about
an opposing candidate which is false,”98 reaches far beyond
oppositional straight-out lies.
Recognizing potential First Amendment issues, a
number of states have tried to bring their regulations within the
doctrine governing defamation of public figures in civil actions
by including requirements that the speaker proceeded with
“actual malice”99 or in “reckless disregard” of knowledge that
other campaign falsehoods in elections for national office. See State v. Jude, 554
N.W.2d 750, 752 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
95
See supra Part II.
96
For statutes criminalizing false speech about opponents, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 113-109 (2015); LA. STAT. ANN. § 18:1463 (2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 56, § 42
(2014); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.21 (LexisNexis 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. §
20A-11-1103 (LexisNexis 2010); W. VA. CODE § 3-8-11(c) (2013); WIS. STAT. § 12.05
(2004). Similarly, for statutes criminalizing false speech about opponents or the other
side regarding substantive issues submitted to voters, see ALASKA STAT. §
15.13.095(a) (2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-13-109(2)(a) (2015); LA. STAT. ANN. §
18:1463(c) (2008); MINN. STAT. § 211B.06 (2014); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-274(a)(7)–
(8) (2015); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-10-04(2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.21
(LexisNexis 2013), held unconstitutional by Magda v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 58
N.E.3d 1188 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016); OR. REV. STAT. § 260.532 (2013).
97
E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 56, § 42 (2014).
98
FLA. STAT. § 104.271(2) (2015).
99
E.g., FLA. STAT. § 104.271(2) (2015). Statutes aimed at false campaign
advertisements may incorporate the language of defamation law governing public
figures, requiring actual malice or reckless disregard, which are notoriously hard to
prove. Lee Goldman, False Campaign Advertising and the “Actual Malice” Standard, 82
TUL. L. REV. 889 passim (2008) (arguing that the standard should be relaxed). Some
statutes that allowed liability on a standard of less than actual malice have been
struck down or amended to include an actual malice standard. See, e.g., Weaver v.
Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2002) (addressing the constitutionality of
Canons of the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct and JQC rule regulating statements
by judicial candidates); Ancheta v. Watada, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1122–23 (D.
Haw. 2001) (examining provisions of the statutory Code of Fair Campaign
Practices); Butler v. Alabama Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, 802 So. 2d 207, 218–19
(Ala. 2001) (examining the Federal Constitution of Alabama Canon of Judicial
Ethics); In re Chmura, 608 N.W.2d at 43–44 (addressing the constitutionality of
Canon 7(B)(1)(d) of the Code of Judicial Conduct); State v. Jude, 554 N.W.2d 750,
753– 54 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996); Smith v. Russell, 456 So. 2d 462, 464 (Fla. 1984)
(“[T]he applicable New York Times standard allows public figures or public officials
to recover for injury to reputation only upon clear and convincing proof of actual
malice.”); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 56, § 42 (2014); MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15875 (2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-13-16 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-142
(2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-11-1103 (LexisNexis 2010); W. VA. CODE § 3-811(c) (2013); WIS. STAT. § 12.05 (2011).
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the statement was false.100 Those statutes do not appear to
impose an affirmative obligation to ascertain the facts before
speaking.101
Statutes also frequently reach any false statement about
either side that “is intended or tends to affect any voting at any
primary, convention, or election.”102 These provisions reach
beyond allegations about candidates to referenda and other
substantive ballot issues, including, as Florida’s legislature puts
it, “any false statement designed to affect the vote on any issue
submitted to the electors.”103 There are generally no guardrails
around these provisions analogous to the actual malice or
reckless disregard requirements for defamatory falsehoods
about candidates.
A smaller number of jurisdictions also prohibit deceptive
speech tending to benefit the speaker or the candidate with
whom the speaker is associated, what I have called the selfreferential straight-out lie and the intentional distortion falsely
claiming credit.104 These provisions do not impose any
particular standard of care because the candidate knows better
than anyone whether misleading biographical information is
true or false.105 The statements at issue range from misleading
100

See, e.g., Green v. N. Publ’g Co., 655 P.2d 736, 741 (Alaska 1982), cert. denied, 463
U.S. 1208 (1983). But see In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gableman,
784 N.W.2d 631, 639 (Wis. 2010) (Prosser, J.) (proceeding with an evenly divided
court, leaving proceedings below in place) (discussing whether defamation law,
developed in a civil context where no government regulation applies, is inapplicable
to regulation of campaign speech).
101
Sharkey v. Fla. Elections Comm’n, 90 So.3d 937, 939 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d
2012) (holding that a failure to investigate whether a falsehood was true before
speaking does not satisfy the actual malice standard in Florida’s statute barring false
statements about opposing candidates).
102
UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-11-1103 (LexisNexis 2017) (“A person may not
knowingly make or publish, or cause to be made or published, any false statement in
relation to any candidate, proposed constitutional amendment, or other measure,
that is intended or tends to affect any voting at any primary, convention, or
election.”).
103
FLA. STAT. § 104.271 (2017).
104
COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-13-109 (2016) (“any false statement designed to affect the
vote”); LA. STAT. ANN. § 42:1130.5 (2016) (false claim to have an endorsement, and
“any false statement”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 56, § 7 (2017) (falsehood designed or
tending to “aid” election); MINN. STAT. §211B (2017) (tends to elect or promote
ballot issue); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-10-04 (2016) (false statements “on behalf of”);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.22 (“false statement . . . designed to promote the
adoption . . . of any ballot proposition or issue”); OR. REV. STAT. § 260.532 (2015)
(false statements of “material fact relating to any candidate, political committee or
measure”); UTAH CODE ANN. §20A-11-1103 (LexisNexis 2017) (“any false statement
in relation to any candidate, proposed constitutional amendment, or other measure,
that is intended or tends to affect any voting . . .”).
105
The Washington statute expressly notes that a candidate “cannot defame himself
or herself,” making false statements by the candidate or the candidate’s supporters
exempt from the portion of the statute regulating defamation with actual malice.
WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17A.335(3) (2017); see also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 352 n.16 (1995).
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claims of current incumbency (discussed supra Part II.B) to false
claims about having received endorsements, to deceptive
biographical details such as having attended or graduated from
a prestigious college, having served honorably in the military,
or having received a military honor.
None of those statutes appear to limit the antics of the
rare candidate who assumes a new identity in an effort to win
votes. Issues surrounding name changes by two candidates in
Arizona’s 7th Congressional district arose during the 2014
election season in the midst of a crowded Democratic primary
to replace a retiring Congressman. In a district where more than
fifty percent of the voters were Hispanic, a Hispanic surname
was thought to be highly advantageous.
Scott Fistler, who had previously sought office as a
Republican and began the primary season with his Republican
registration intact, legally changed his name to Cesar Chavez,
piggybacking on the renown of the widely respected labor
organizer and civil rights activist whose reputation would
presumably resonate with many of the district’s voters. Fistler,
who does not appear to have any Hispanic ancestors, also
changed his party registration midway through the primary
season so that he could get on the ballot. The grandson of the
renowned Cesar Chavez sued to enjoin the name change, but
the suit was promptly dismissed.106 No statute stood in FistlerChavez’s way. As in most or all states, Arizona law permits
name changes unless made with “intent to defraud,” whether or
not the change is registered with the state.107
At about the same time, a lawsuit was filed against a
Hispanic leader in the state’s House of Representatives, also
running in the Democratic congressional primary, who had
changed his name from Ruben Marinelarena to Ruben
Marinelarena Gallego. The suit was filed by supporters of yet
another primary candidate of Hispanic origin, Mary Rose
Wilcox, who sometimes included her birth name, Garrido, on
campaign materials, and who posited, “We the people have a
right to know who is running to represent us in Congress.”108
Gallego retorted that he had changed his name from the family
106

Meghan Kenneally, Arizona Congressional Candidate Changes His Name to Cesar
Chavez in Order to Appeal to Hispanic Voters, DAILY MAIL,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2647456/Arizona-congressionalcandidate-changes-Cesar-Chavez-order-appeal-Hispanic-voters.html (last updated
June 3, 2014, 5:18 PM); Jaime Fuller, This Arizona Candidate Changed His Name. His
Opponent Wasn’t Happy About It., WASH. POST (June 12, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/06/12/this-arizonacandidate-changed-his-name-his-opponent-wasnt-happy-aboutit/?utm_term=.eb182c67190e.
107
4 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 483 (15th ed. 2017).
108 Fuller, supra note 104.
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name of his father who had abandoned him in infancy to that
of his mother who had raised him as a single parent and whose
father was “a father figure” to him.109 Apparently voters did not
agree with Wilcox that Gallego was trying to mislead them;
Gallego won handily and still represents the district.
The two name-change stories are manifestly
distinguishable. One appeared to be nothing but a stunt
intended to mislead the uninformed, the other (predating the
primary by four years) reflected biographical realities that
regularly lead people to change their names. It is hard to
imagine a statute that could bar the first while permitting the
second, unless the name change was required to have preceded
the election by a certain number of years.110
A handful of states outlaw falsehoods in specific
settings, including political advertisements,111 during telephone
polling,112 and at polling places (where many states outlaw all
electioneering).113 One state expressly targets charges about the
“honesty, integrity, or moral character of any candidate, so far
as his or her private life is concerned, unless the charge shall be
in fact true and actually capable of proof.”114 The statute further
provides that any statements that “clearly and unmistakably
imply” such attacks on personal integrity shall be treated as a
direct charge (reaching what I have labelled indirect
prevarications as well as straight-out oppositional lies and
intentional distortions).115
Misleading campaign speech and complaints alleging
falsehood by the other side often enter the marketplace very
shortly before the balloting occurs. The short time frame until
election day makes it much more difficult for the candidate
who was besmirched or the party against whom a meritless
complaint for violating a campaign falsehood statute is filed to
respond effectively.116
109

Id.
If I ran for office, my opponent could accuse me of changing my name from
Rosovsky to Ross, because my father “Americanized” our family name when I was a
toddler.
111
MINN. STAT. § 211B.06 (2014); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-10-04 (2015); OR. REV.
STAT. § 260.532(1) (2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-142 (2014).
112
ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.095 (2016).
113
MINN. STAT. § 211B.11 (2014); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-41(c) (2007); see also
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (upholding narrowly drawn statute barring
electioneering at polling places).
114 MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-875 (2015).
115
Id.
116
For example, in List, even though the allegedly false campaign materials appeared
as early as August 9, Congressman Driehaus did not file his complaint with the Ohio
Elections Commission until “[j]ust before the election,” and proceedings were
ongoing on election day. List v. Driehaus, 779 F.3d 628, 631 (6th Cir. 2015). Until
2017, Mississippi barred any accusations that a candidate had violated the campaign
deception statute within five days of an election, or on election day. That provision
110
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Outside the context of ballot initiatives, referenda and
the like, no statute appears to expressly limit campaign
deception of any variety respecting substantive issues.117 To the
extent that statutes are modelled on defamation law, they are
inapplicable to ballot issues and substantive debate.118
III. FIRST AMENDMENT BARRIERS TO REGULATING
CAMPAIGN FALSEHOODS
Now we reach the constitutional day of reckoning: can
the federal and state statutes regulating deception in political
campaigns survive First Amendment scrutiny? Or, do they raise
the specter of “Oceana’s Ministry of Truth,” which the Alvarez
plurality reminded us has no place in “[o]ur constitutional
tradition”?119
A. First Principles, Content-Based Regulations, and the Ministry of
Truth
The Ministry of Truth wielded enormous power in the
Oceana of George Orwell’s 1984. Like other ministries in
Oceana, it did the opposite of what its name suggested. The
Ministry of Truth dealt with lies. That is, it falsified the past
and the present, ensuring no other sources of information were
available for public consumption, so that whatever the rulers
was repealed in 2017. MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-875, Amendment Notes (2017).
The former language acknowledged the difficulty of responding to last minute
accusations, including accusations that one had violated a law that prohibits
allegations “with respect to integrity” of the opposing candidate. Recent
developments, including heavy reliance on social media both to spread falsehood
and to respond it and voting that is spread over several weeks, may affect the
calculations about the window of opportunity for deception and response. Oregon’s
statute anticipates the urgency of resolving campaign deception disputes by requiring
that all complaints under its law be filed within 30 days of the election during which
the violation allegedly occurred, and that courts expedite hearings on such claims, so
that final judgments relating to primary elections be rendered no later than 30 days
before the general election, and final judgments respecting complaints arising during
a general election be resolved “before the term of that office begins.” OR. REV. STAT.
§ 260.532 (9) (2017).
117
Greg Mellen, Huntington Beach Prepared to Go to Court to Keep At-Large Elections,
ORANGE CTY. REGISTER (May 25, 2017, 5:11 PM),
https://www.ocregister.com/2017/05/25/huntington-beach-prepared-to-go-tocourt-to-keep-at-large-elections/ (interpreting and applying a statute governing
deception in the language of ballot propositions and the accompanying explanatory
material). See supra note 102 (listing statutes that seem broad enough to reach
campaign deception respecting substantive positions of individual candidates).
Language targeting false statements “intended” or “tending to” affect the outcome of
an election may reach misrepresentation of substantive positions, but I have not
found any cases interpreting that language as reaching substantive claims that were
not understood as disparaging the other side.
118
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 352 n.16 (1995) (quoting
People v. White, 506 N.E.2d 1284, 1288 (Ill. 1987) (“A public question clearly
cannot be the victim of character assassination.”).
119
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 723 (2012) (plurality opinion).
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declared as truth became “truth.” It is the perfect propaganda
machinery for the state because it methodically eliminates all
sources of conflicting ideas and messages, even as it scales back
language itself.120
In contrast to such dystopias and authoritarian regimes,
the Speech Clause forbids any “broad censorial power” vested
in government.121 To avoid even the risk of chilling expression,
“as a general matter, the First Amendment means that
government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”122 Any
effort to proscribe speech as false—whether as a straight-out lie
or an indirect prevarication, or anything in between—
necessarily rests on its content. Such content-based regulations
are presumptively unconstitutional, unless they aim at the
narrow categories of speech that fall outside the First
Amendment’s protection such as defamation, fraud, or
obscenity.
Before the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in United
States v. Alvarez, legislatures could arguably be forgiven if they
were under the impression that falsehoods might fall outside the
First Amendment’s protections altogether or, at a minimum,
receive less zealous protection than other forms of speech.123
More than 100 federal statutes regulated falsehoods.124 And
there was a Circuit split over whether the Speech Clause
protected falsehood when the Court considered Alvarez.125
Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in Alvarez, however,
forcefully repudiated the government’s assertion that it had the
power to control deception. The cases do not establish, Justice
Kennedy insisted, the “principle” the government urged in
Alvarez, “that all proscriptions of false statements are exempt
120

GEORGE ORWELL, Appendix: The Principles of Newspeak, in ANIMAL FARM: 1984
379 (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 2003) (1949) (heretical thought becomes literally
“unthinkable” through the elimination of words which “simply ceased to exist”).
121
Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 723 (plurality opinion).
122
Id. at 716 (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002)).
123
Brief of Petitioner at 18–36, United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) No. 11210; Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 732–33 (Breyer, J., concurring) (conceding that the “Court
has frequently said or implied that false factual statements enjoy little First
Amendment protection”); Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 746 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing cases
recognizing that “false factual statements possess no intrinsic First Amendment
value”).
124
See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 747–48 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that “many kinds of
false factual statements have long been proscribed without ‘raising any
Constitutional problem,’” including “[l]aws prohibiting fraud, perjury, and
defamation,” and that “more than 100 federal criminal statutes” punish “false
statements” related to the work of federal agencies).
125
United States v. Strandlof, 667 F.3d 1146, 1160 (10th Cir. 2012) (upholding the
Stolen Valor Act and a conviction under it using “breathing space” analysis, not
strict scrutiny, and reviewing the rulings of “most circuit courts” that false statements
of fact receive “limited First Amendment protection”), vacated, 684 F.3d 962 (10th
Cir. 2012).
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from exacting First Amendment scrutiny.”126 They do not
support the “broader proposition that false statements are
unprotected when made to any person, at any time, in any
context.”127 Most starkly, a law that “targets falsity and nothing
more” violates the First Amendment.128 There would be,
Kennedy wrote, “no limiting principle” if the government had
“authority to compile a list of subjects about which false
statements are punishable” regardless of “whether shouted from
the rooftops or made in a barely audible whisper.” 129
The Court held that the First Amendment protected
Alvarez’s straight-out self-referential lie, a form of puffery, and
overturned the federal Stolen Valor Act under which he was
convicted. Even a “straight-out lie,” the Court underscored,
could not be criminalized based on its indisputable falsity
without more: harm to others or unwarranted advantage to the
speaker.130
The dissenters in Alvarez, who would have upheld both
the Stolen Valor Act and Alvarez’s conviction under it,
acknowledged that “it is perilous to permit the state to be the
arbiter of truth.”131 Even if we could ignore the state action
required to ban deception in campaign speech, how would such
statutes be administered and enforced absent a government role
in discerning what is true or false?
Broadly speaking, the statutes rely on two courses of
action. The candidate or concerned citizens may complain by
going directly to court, or by asking a state agency or
prosecutor to determine whether a prima facie case has been
made that a campaign engaged in the type of deceptive speech
the statute bars, in which case a court would then conduct
hearings. In either instance, the state (whether through the
126

Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 720 (plurality opinion).
Id.
128
Id. at 719.
129
Id. at 723.
130
Id. at 727. Kennedy cabined the Court’s earlier statements about falsehoods that
the state could punish within several narrow categories. These included falsehoods
voiced “to effect a fraud or secure moneys or other valuable considerations,” several
types of material falsehoods made to government officials, and perjured testimony,
made under oath, which “undermines the function . . . of the law,” forms the basis of
government action and “affects the rights and liberties of others.” Id. at 720–21. The
rights and liberties of others include the victims of defamation, long protected under
common law. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 11–12 (“Since the latter
half of the 16th century, the common law has afforded a cause of action for damage
to a person's reputation by the publication of false and defamatory statements”
thereby “allowing an individual to vindicate his good name” and obtain “redress for
harm caused by such statements”). This is why many of the statutory frameworks
discussed in Part III are modeled on laws regulating fraud or libel. See
Commonwealth v. Lucas, 34 N.E.3d 1242, 1246–50 (Mass. 2015) (rejecting the
State’s arguments that the campaign speech statute aims at unprotected fraudulent
and defamatory expression).
131
Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 752 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting).
127
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executive branch, an independent agency, or ultimately the
judiciary) becomes the arbiter of truth. As the Supreme Court
explained in New York Times v. Sullivan, the precise form the
government uses to impose truthfulness is irrelevant:
“Authoritative interpretations of the First Amendment
guarantees have consistently refused to recognize an exception
for any test of truth—whether administered by judges, juries, or
administrative officials . . . .”132 For the time being, I’ll ask that
you set aside that particular obstacle to regulation, because the
enforcement mechanism may be the least of the First
Amendment barriers to constraining deceptive campaign
speech, as I argue in the next part.
B. Legal Standards
The Supreme Court has never considered whether lies in
campaign speech can be regulated without violating the
expressive rights of speakers.133 Alvarez and earlier Supreme
Court decisions set out a framework, but do not expressly
resolve a number of threshold issues including: whether lies in
political campaigns and other political speech have greater or
lesser constitutional protection than autobiographical lies of the
sort at issue in the case;134 and what standard of review applies
to inhibitions on protected but deceptive expression.135 Alvarez is
the starting point for any contemporary discussion of laws
governing falsehood; it informs but does not determine the
outcome of recent cases in which litigants have challenged the
constitutionality of campaign deception statutes.
Like other types of expression, even political speech is
not immune from prosecution if it fits within a category of
speech that falls outside the First Amendment. Where the
restrictions on election falsehood aim at defamatory
communications, there is no need to choose a standard of
review if the court determines that the speech is defamatory

132

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964).
The decision in Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus focused on justiciability issues:
standing and mootness. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341–
47 (2014). The Court did not reach the merits.
134
E.g., Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 732–33 (Breyer, J., concurring); Susan B. Anthony List v.
Driehaus, 814 F.3d 466, 472 (6th Cir. 2016); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct.
2218, 2235–36 (2015); 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 766 F.3d 774, 784 (8th Cir.
2014).
135
There was no majority on the issue of what standard of review should apply in
Alvarez. The plurality used the terms “exacting” and “most exacting” instead of strict
scrutiny, presumably because Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion proposed using
“proportionality” or intermediate scrutiny which would only require the state to
demonstrate a “legitimate” objective rather than a compelling interest. Alvarez, 567
U.S. at 724 (plurality opinion); id. at 730 (Breyer, J., concurring).
133
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under New York Times v. Sullivan.136 New York Times sets a high
bar for recovery where public figures, a group that includes all
candidates for public office, allege that they have been defamed.
It requires clear and convincing evidence that the statement was
false and that the defendant acted with actual malice or reckless
disregard of the truth.137
This is a hard standard to satisfy under the best of
circumstances, and “recovery by a candidate is highly
unusual.”138 That matters because, as discussed above, so many
state statutes attempt to squeeze regulation of campaign
communications within the framework of defamation.139
1. Political speech under Alvarez
It has long been undisputed that political speech is at the
apex of First Amendment freedoms.140 We have, the Supreme
Court reminds us again and again, “a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust and wide-open.”141 Even before Alvarez,
the Court warned that the “breathing space” the First
Amendment requires for such robust debate carries the risk of
falsehoods and broken promises.142
Speech related to political campaigns may be even more
sacrosanct, at least according to longstanding dicta. The
foundational principle that inhibitions on expression based on
content are presumptively invalid has, the Supreme Court has
stated, the “‘fullest and most urgent application’ to speech
uttered during a campaign for political office.”143 The reasons
136

Rickert v. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n, 168 P.3d 826, 859 (Wash. 2007) (en banc)
(Madsen, J., dissenting) (“[I]f the actual malice standard is met[,] the speech . . . is
not constitutionally protected” and the statute does not have to be analyzed under
strict scrutiny.); see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–280
(1964).
137
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80.
138
Reed v. Gallagher, 204 Cal. Rptr. 3d 178, 196 (Cal. Ct. App. 3d 2016) (quoting
Beilenson v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 357, 365 (1996)).
139
See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text.
140
See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218–19 (1966) (“[T]here is practically
universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect
the free discussion of governmental affairs,” including “candidates” and “all such
matters relating to political processes.”); Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm.,
489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989); see also ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS
RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).
141
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
142
Id. at 271–72 (“[E]rroneous statement is inevitable in free debate . . . ”); Brown v.
Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 55 (1982) (“[P]romises” are “indispensable to decisionmaking
in a democracy,” but here candidate’s promise to take a reduced salary was barred by
statute, and quickly retracted.).
143
Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 734 (2011)
(quoting Eu v. San Francisco Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223
(1989)); see also Brown, 456 U.S. at 53 (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S.
265, 271–72 (1971)). In the more recent decisions, much of the “speech” at issue is
actually the expenditure of money.
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are manifold. As James Madison explained in 1800, electing
public officials is “the essence of a free and responsible
government. The value and efficacy of this right depends on the
knowledge of the comparative merits and demerits of the
candidates for public trust, and on the equal freedom,
consequently, of examining and discussing these merits and
demerits . . . .”144 In more modern parlance, although false
statements during elections may have profound consequences if
they mislead voters,145 a state may not “enhance[] the ability of
its citizenry to make wise decisions by restricting the flow of
information to them.”146 Cutting off the flow of information to
voters not only diminishes the campaign’s expressive rights, it
also implicates the voter’s right to receive information.
Therefore, it is a bit startling that the various opinions in
Alvarez seem to signal a step back from full protection for
campaign speech.147 Recall that the splintered opinions
provided no majority resolution of what standard of scrutiny
applies to falsehood. If intermediate scrutiny were to apply to
all false speech, then Alvarez would not mean what six justices
agreed the case stands for: falsehood is not categorically
removed from First Amendment protections, at least without
the government showing some more specific harm. If that is the
case, then it suggests that the hierarchy of First Amendment
values which, if anything, privilege political and campaign
speech, should remain in place until “something more” (such as
defamation within the context of political speech) is proven that
removes the particular statement from constitutional protection.
The Eighth Circuit, considering a sister statute to the statute at
issue in List, distinguished Alvarez as a case that did not involve
political speech, but rather involved a statute that proscribed
falsehood outside the political context.148 It held that strict
scrutiny applies when the state attempts to regulate political
speech at the core of First Amendment protections and that,
“Alvarez does not alter the landscape on this issue.”149
A closer look at the plurality and concurring opinions in
Alvarez provides some insight. Concurring, Justice Breyer
distinguished “false statements about verifiable facts” of the sort
144

Harte-Hanks Commc’ns., Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 687–688 (1989)
(quoting James Madison (citing THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS
ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 575 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 4th ed. 1861))).
145
See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 349 (1995).
146
Eu v. San Francisco Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 228 (1989)
(The state’s claim must “be viewed with some skepticism.”).
147
E.g., 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 766 F.3d 774, 797 (8th Cir. 2014) (reversing a
district court’s conclusion that Alvarez mandated intermediate scrutiny in a case
involving campaign speech).
148
Id. at 782–85.
149
Id. at 784.
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at issue in Alvarez from the potentially broader reach of the
Stolen Valor Act.150 He would impose a clear mens rea
requirement even in the context of verifiability.151
More importantly, he worried that the Stolen Valor Act
could reach “political contexts, where such lies are more likely
to cause harm,” presumably by misleading voters. And, he
continued, the regulations may inadvertently distort political
discourse because of the risk of selective prosecution of
falsehoods.152 It is easy to imagine an administrative body with
authority over campaign falsehood whose members were
appointed by an incumbent governor who is running for
reelection selectively choosing which deceptions merit
investigation and which statements meet the definition of
falsehood. Much less would be needed to find selective
prosecution.
Breyer analogizes the risks of consumer confusion in
trademark law to certain kinds of lies the government might
have a compelling interest in restricting. He reminds us that
trademark plaintiffs must usually show that confusion is likely
before they can claim a risk of dilution. Couldn’t candidates
unfairly tarred by deceptive speech make similar claims: “voters
are likely to be confused” or “my reputation will be
diminished.” But could the candidates back those claims up
with statistically reliable evidence?
And Justice Breyer anticipated chill in both public and
private contexts (“barstool braggadocio” as well as “family,
social or other private contexts”).153 Justice Kennedy, writing
for the plurality, sounded similar alarms about the statute’s
potential reach into: “personal, whispered conversations within
a home. The statute seeks to control and suppress all false
statements on this one subject in almost limitless times and
settings.”154 Some state statutes aimed at campaign deception
share the same infirmity.155 But nothing in the Alvarez plurality
150

United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 732 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring). But cf.
id. at 710 (plurality opinion).
151
Id. at 732 (Breyer, J., concurring).
152
Id. at 736.
153
Id. at 736–37.
154
Id. at 722–23 (plurality opinion).
155
COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-13-109 (2016) (any “person” who makes “any false
statement designed to affect the vote”); LA STAT. ANN. § 18:1463(2)(C) (2016)
(reaching false statements by any person who “knows or should reasonably be
expected to know” that it is false, about a candidate or a proposition submitted to
voters); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 56, § 7 (2017) (falsehood designed or tending to “aid”
election); MINN. STAT. §211B.06(B) (2017) (reaching letters to the editor that are
“false” and tend to elect or promote ballot issue); UTAH CODE ANN. §20A-111103(reaching any “person” who “knowingly” makes “any false statement in
relation to any candidate, proposed constitutional amendment, or other measure,
that is intended or tends to affect any voting . . .”). See also MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch.
56 § 42, overturned by Commonwealth v. Lucas, 34 N.E. 3d 1242 (Mass. 2015)
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opinion, or in Justice Breyer’s concurrence, indicates whether
or to what extent the Court’s prior statements about diminished
protection for “calculated falsehood” in political campaigns
remains good law after Alvarez.
C. Scrutinizing Regulation of Campaign Lies
Before Alvarez, a number of scholars compared the
regulation of campaign falsehoods to the regulation of
campaign finance in that both seek to mitigate potential
distortions; but all or most of them wrote before the Supreme
Court upended the government’s capacity to control campaign
spending.156 Commentators before and after Alvarez have
disagreed about whether any effort to restrain deception during
political campaigns could withstand First Amendment
challenge.157 Some authorities who support regulation of
falsehood during campaigns have relied on the defamation
model many states have used, including the “actual malice”
standard, or have argued that the standard need not be so high
because of the unique dangers inherent in false manipulation of
voters.158 And still others, like Diogenes seeking the honest
person, are on a quest to craft a statute that would strike the
right balance between freedom of expression and electoral
integrity.159
Outside the defamation framework,160 most state courts
and lower federal courts considering restrictions on campaign
(applicable to ballot issues, applied as soon as the issue was announced and could be
enforced against exchanges “between two friends engaged in a spirited political
discussion in a local pub.”).
156
William P. Marshall, False Campaign Speech and the First Amendment, 153 U. PA. L.
REV. 285, 300–22 (2004); see also Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010);
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93,
171–73 (2003).
157
Many scholars argue that campaign falsehood statutes are unlikely to survive
constitutional review. See, e.g., Jack Windsbro, Misrepresentation in Political Advertising:
The Role of Legal Sanctions, 36 EMORY L.J. 853, 863–65 (1987) (pre-Alvarez)
(emphasizing that the cure is more and better speech); Lance Conn, Mississippi
Mudslinging: The Search for Truth in Political Advertising, 63 MISS. L.J. 507, 514 n.40
(1994) (restrictions on electoral lies chill speech and are ineffective); Richard L.
Hasen, supra note 2.
158
E.g., Michelle Roberts, Ask Me No Questions and I’ll Tell You No Lies: The First
Amendment in Ballot Question Campaigns, 33 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 37, passim (2013)
(arguing that falsehood with actual malice is outside the First Amendment); Jason
Zenor, A Reckless Disregard for Truth? The Constitutional Right to Lie in Politics, 38
CAMPBELL L. REV. 41, 63–71 (2016) (arguing for an intermediate standard of review
akin to commercial speech doctrine); Goldman, supra note 99, at 892–97 (discussing
false negative ads as “serious First Amendment concerns,” but advocating for a
negligence standard immediately prior to balloting).
159
E.g., Staci Lieffring, First Amendment and the Right to Lie: Regulating Knowingly False
Campaign Speech After United States v. Alvarez, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1047, 1076–78
(2013).
160
List v. Driehaus, 779 F.3d 628, 633 (6th Cir. 2015) (affirming summary judgment
to SBA List on grounds that the elements of defamation were not established because
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speech since Alvarez have applied strict scrutiny, reasoning that
it is the standard for all content-based regulations.161 If there
had been any doubt, several courts have noted, Reed v. Gilbert
resolved the issue.162
Strict scrutiny provides that content-based laws “are
presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the
government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve
compelling state interests.”163 Applying strict scrutiny to
campaign deception regimes reveals a cornucopia of First
Amendment flaws in each of the statutes that have reached the
courts.
2. Compelling interest.
The lower courts have generally had little difficulty
acknowledging the compelling nature of the government
interest in regulating campaign lies: to preserve the integrity of
the electoral process; to protect “voters from confusion and
undue influence,” sometimes described as distortion; and to
“ensur[e] that an individual’s right to vote is not undermined by
fraud in the election process.”164 However, states overstep when
they offer what the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
terms “the rather remarkable argument that the election context
gives the government broader authority to restrict speech”
the facts were “subject to differing interpretations”); see also Commonwealth v.
Lucas, 34 N.E.3d 1242, 1246 (Mass. 2015) (rejecting the state’s efforts to “shoehorn”
its campaign deception law into the categorical exceptions of fraud or defamation).
161
Driehaus, 814 F.3d at 472 (noting that strict scrutiny applies to restrictions on
“core speech” and indeed to all content-based regulations, whether under “old . . . or
more recent First Amendment law”) (citing, inter alia, Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135
S. Ct. 2218, 2230 (2015) (reiterating that strict scrutiny applies to all content-based
prohibitions on expression)); Winter v. Woinitzek, 834 F.3d 681, 693 (6th Cir. 2016)
(holding that strict scrutiny applies to the false statements and misleading statements
clauses of Kentucky’s ban on speech during judicial elections); 281 Care Comm. v.
Arneson, 766 F.3d 774, 779 n.9 (8th Cir. 2014) (standard hotly contested below in
light of splintered decision in Alvarez, strict scrutiny applies to regulations on falsity
in the “context of political campaigns on a ballot issue”); Lucas, 34 N.E.3d at 1250–
52 (discussing Alvarez in light of Gilbert and applying strict scrutiny as required for a
content-based regulation and as directed by the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights).
162
Driehaus, 814 F.3d at 473 (citing Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2230
(2015) (clarifying that strict scrutiny applies to all content-based regulations, even if
the regulation does not distinguish based on viewpoint)).
163
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015).
164
E.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992); 281 Care Comm., 766 F.3d at
785–86 (assuming, for purposes of analysis, that the compelling interest had been
established and noting that the State “indisputably has a compelling interest in
preserving the integrity of its election process”); Lucas, 34 N.E.3d at 1252 (“[A]s a
general matter,” the State has a compelling interest in “free and fair elections.”);
Rickert v. State Pub. Disclosure Comm’n, 168 P.3d 826, 858–80 (Wash. 2007) (en
banc) (Madsen, J., dissenting); Pub. Disclosure Comm’n v. 119 Vote No! Comm.,
957 P.2d 691, 699–700 (Wa. 1998) (Madsen, J., concurring). But see Rickert, 168 P.3d
at 830 (rejecting the claim that the legislature has a compelling interest in “protecting
political candidates (including themselves)”).
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presumably to help citizens discern reliable campaign
statements.165 To the contrary, a long line of cases make clear
that, “The opposite is true.”166
The countervailing interests in protecting political
speech might weigh heavily against even acknowledging that
the state’s interest is compelling, because of the constitutional
imperative of protecting free speech during campaigns for
political office.167 The claim that the state may “prohibit false
statements of fact in political advertisements” or in a broader
swath of expression “presupposes that the State possesses an
independent right to determine truth and falsity in political
debate . . . Rather, the First Amendment operates to insure the
public decides what is true and false with respect to
governance.”168
Even before Alvarez, the Supreme Court of Washington
held that the state lacked a compelling interest in regulating
speech published with actual malice in political advertisements
that contained a false statement of material fact—at least if the
lies did not defame an actual person.169 The court expressly
rejected the state’s reliance on defamation law because the
statute at issue reached (and the controversy in the case before
it involved) a referendum; the absence of an individual whose
private rights could be harmed or vindicated rendered
defamation inapposite.170 Where an initiative measure is
involved, the court held, “there is no competing interest
sufficient to override our precious freedom to vigorously debate

165

Lucas, 34 N.E.3d at 1253.
Id.; Rickert, 168 P.3d at 827; 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 766 F.3d 774, 793 (8th
Cir. 2014). In 2009, the legislature of the State of Washington explained the purpose
of post-Rickert legislation barring defamatory statements made with actual malice as
part of campaign materials: such statements “damage the integrity of elections by
distorting the electoral process. Democracy is premised on an informed electorate.
To the extent such defamatory statements misinform the voters, they interfere with
the process upon which democracy is based, . . . lower the quality of campaign
discourse and debate, and lead or add to voter alienation by fostering voter cynicism
and distrust of the political process.” S. Comm. on Gov’t Operations & Elections, B.
5211, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2009), amending Rev. Code Wash. 42.17.530.
167
See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995); 119 Vote No!
Comm., 957 P.2d at 698 (rejecting the State’s asserted compelling interest in shielding
the public from falsehood during campaigns as “patronizing and paternalistic”).
168
119 Vote No!, 957 P.2d at 695 (citing Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 419–20
(1963)); Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 791 (1988).
169
119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d at 691.
170
Id. at 697 (citing Charles Fried, Speech in the Welfare State: The New First Amendment
Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225, 238 (1992)). The state
legislature subsequently adopted a statute limited to political advertisements that
with actual malice contained a false statement of material fact about a candidate for
public office. 1999 WASH. SESS. LAWS 1290 § 2(1)(a)(1999). That law, too, was found
unconstitutional on its face. Rickert, 168 P.3d at 845.
166
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the wisdom of enacting a measure, even if that debate contains
falsehoods as well as truths.”171
In light of Alvarez, another way of thinking about the
state’s compelling interest would be to ask whether the state
was targeting the kinds of harms—the “something more” than
even a straight-out lie—that the plurality said was required
before silencing protected speech: harm to others or
unwarranted advantage to the speaker. This inquiry turns out
not to be simple either.
Presumably, winning an election might be construed as
securing employment or other benefit of the sort the Alvarez
plurality had in mind. One might think that if Alvarez had
falsely claimed to be a war hero during his election campaign,
and that claim garnered votes for him, he would have obtained
a concrete benefit, subjecting his lie to regulation. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court considered that very
hypothetical. It concluded that Alvarez inoculates from criminal
prosecution a candidate who might make Alvarez’s false claim
“at a preelection debate.”172 No court appears to have addressed
the question whether misleading the public constitutes the sort
of harm to others the Alvarez plurality had in mind, which itself
suggests the answer is no. Consistent with the precedents the
plurality discussed, that harm likely requires an individual who
is defrauded, defamed, or otherwise suffers directly as a result
of speech that the First Amendment is already understood not
to protect.
3. Narrow tailoring
Establishing a compelling interest is just the beginning of
the analysis. The state must next show that its regulations have
a relationship to the danger it seeks to forestall,173 that the
remedy is narrowly crafted, and that it is neither underinclusive
nor overbroad. Outside of the judicial election context,
discussed in Part V below, none of the state campaign
deception statutes that have reached the courts since Alvarez
have survived the next stages of strict scrutiny.174

171

119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d at 700.
Commonwealth v. Lucas, 34 N.E.3d 1242, 1253 (Mass. 2015).
173
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995); Brown v. Entm’t
Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799–803 (2011).
174
Before Alvarez, some courts had sustained regulations on deceptive campaign
speech. Goldman, supra note 99. Afterwards, courts held that Alvarez required them
to reject those precedents. E.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 814 F.3d 466,
470-71 (6th Cir. 2016) (expressly rejecting reliance on Pestrak v. Ohio Elections
Comm’n, 926 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1992), because Alvarez “clearly abrogates Pestrak’s
reasoning” that false speech is unprotected).
172
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a. Is the inhibition of speech necessary to address the problem?
A tight “fit” or nexus is required between the compelling
interest a regulation on speech is designed to serve and the
specific inhibition on expression. The restriction must be
“actually necessary” to achieve the state’s goals,175 and the state
must demonstrate “a direct causal link between the restriction
imposed and the injury to be prevented.”176
Government lawyers defending deceptive campaign
speech statutes have asked courts to rely on common sense and
“conjecture” about the likely impact of campaign lies.177 A
reasonable inference is not a sufficient substitute for empirical
evidence showing a close link between the harm to be
prevented and the impact of suppressing protected speech.178
Granted, the secret ballot makes it very difficult to ascertain
whether and to what extent voters were deceived by campaign
falsehoods and whether they changed their votes as a result.
The very proposition is undermined in cases where the
victorious candidate was the target of the deceptive speech.179
None of the reported cases contain evidence of the alleged
harm and, failing that, the state cannot show how regulating
campaign speech would ameliorate the purported (though
common-sensical) harms.
b. Overbreadth
Defamatory statements are beyond the First
Amendment’s protection whether the statement is uttered in the
context of a business transaction or an election. However,
statutes that purport to apply the legal standard for defamation
to bar campaign falsehoods are overbroad if they reach
falsehoods that are not defamatory.180
Beyond that threshold problem, even if it were possible
to draft a deceptive campaign speech statute narrowly enough
that it could survive strict scrutiny on its face, matters of timing
175

Brown, 564 U.S. at 799.
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 710 (2012) (plurality opinion).
177
281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 766 F.3d 774, 790 (8th Cir. 2014).
178
Id. at 790 (Minnesota failed to present evidence of harm or efficacy of regulating
campaign speech.); see also Catherine J. Ross, Anything Goes: Examining the State’s
Interest in Protecting Children from Controversial Speech, 53 VAND. L. REV. 427, 501–21
(2000) (The government must show that the harm is real, not conjectural, and that
the regulation will “alleviate the harm ‘in a direct and material way.’”).
179
E.g., Rickert v. State Pub. Disclosure Comm’n, 168 P.3d 826, 828 (Wash. 2007)
(en banc) (The target of falsehood, who complained to the administrative body
charged with enforcing the campaign deception act, was re-elected with 79% of the
vote.); Zollman v. Dawson, 611 P.2d 1175, 1177 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (finding no
evidence that violations of the law were “capable of affecting the result of the
election”).
180
Rickert, 168 P.3d at 828 (holding that non-defamatory false statements about
candidates may not be prohibited).
176
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threaten to make fair application extremely vexing. As I have
noted, many of the false campaign statements and
advertisements that reach the courts appear very shortly before
election day, when there is little time for the target to respond
effectively. The last-minute lie, however, is not treated
differently under the First Amendment.181 The lie is out there,
and given the notorious persistence of misinformation,182 might
be very difficult to dislodge under the best of circumstances:
unlimited time and budget to spread the repetition of the truth.
But elections have a deadline. The lie is in play. This is
the very evil the regulations are intended to redress. However,
an unintended but easily predictable consequence flows from
the regulatory scheme. The target of the alleged lie may
weaponize the regulatory apparatus if (as is often the case) the
enforcement mechanism allows the target, his or her
supporters, or “any citizen” to file a complaint that initiates a
formal inquiry. That inquiry, in turn, is reported in the press,
tarnishing the original speaker, who may not have been lying at
all. Alternatively, the purported deceptive statement may fit
within one of the many definitional loopholes for deception
that will result in the allegations that the statute has been
violated amounting to naught—many months after the election
is over.
The overbreadth potential of campaign deception
statutes is both built in and easily manipulated to reach speech
that will not be found to meet the definitions of lies contained
in a narrowly crafted regulatory scheme. This is, as many
courts have found, exceedingly likely to chill campaign speech.
c. Underinclusiveness
In order for the government’s regulation of campaign
deception to survive strict scrutiny, the regulatory scheme
would need to address all of the intentional deceit that was
likely to cause the harms to the integrity of elections the state
had identified. These would, at minimum, include all of the
categories of lies I have set out: straight-out lies, both
oppositional and self-referential; intentional distortions that can
be disproven; hyperbole that is not so obvious a rhetorical
device that voters are likely to believe it; and indirect
181

“[A]n eleventh-hour anonymous smear campaign” is insufficient to justify a
restriction on speech.” People v. White, 506 N.E.2d 1284, 1288 (Ill. 1987); see also
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 352–53 (1995).
182
Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political
Misperceptions, 32 POL. BEHAV. 303 (2010); R. Kelly Garrett & Brian E. Weeks, The
Promise and Peril of Real-Time Corrections to Political Misperceptions (Feb. 23–27, 2013)
(on file with the Proceedings of the 2013 Conference on Computer Supported
Cooperative Work) (noting that even real-time corrections can be ineffective with
citizens who have already formed views while processing misinformation).
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prevarication—at least if it is shown to be knowing and
intentional.
To the extent that campaign deception statutes only
target straight-out lies about opponents, they are
underinclusive. An exception that allows candidates to lie
about themselves is not calculated to serve the state’s asserted
compelling interest in promoting the integrity of the electoral
process.183
Most, perhaps even all, of the existing campaign
deception statutes, are also underinclusive because they fail to
address many kinds of campaign deceptions that may be at least
as harmful to the electoral process as the ones that are
targeted.184 For example, no statute appears to forbid lies about
substance, such as the candidate’s platform, or the platform’s
likely costs and impact. So-called alternative facts appear to be
beyond any efforts at regulation.
IV. CAN WE IDENTIFY CAMPAIGN LIES WHEN WE SEE THEM?
Even if courts were to find that the state has a
compelling interest in regulating deceptive speech in political
campaigns, and a specific statute and regulatory scheme
survived strict scrutiny, it might prove nearly impossible for
regulators and judges to agree about what constitutes a lie. The
problem does not entirely rest in post-modernist approaches to
reality. Courts have long taken the position that a statement is
not false if any reasonable inference can be drawn from it that is
either a fact or a matter of opinion that is immune from being
labelled untrue.185
In the context of alleged defamation of a public figure,
courts have drawn fine lines in discussing how “far removed
from the truth” a statement must be in order to “permit an
inference of actual malice, even assuming arguendo [a
statement] was false.”186 If the “‘gist or sting’” of the
defamatory statement “is not so very different from the ‘truth,’”
the “campaign rhetoric” is protected.187 More broadly, under
183

Rickert, 168 P.3d at 831; ACLU of Nev. v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979, 996–97 (9th Cir.
2004) (holding that a statute providing exceptions to the ban on anonymous
campaign speech for political parties and candidates still fails narrow tailoring).
184
Id. at 831 (The “statute is underinclusive because it does not apply to many
statements that pose an equal threat to the State’s alleged interest in protecting
elections. Specifically, the statute exempts all statements made by a candidate” or by
the candidate’s supporters about the candidate him- or herself).
185
Mosee v. Clark, 453 P.2d 176, 177 (Or. 1969).
186
Reed v. Gallagher, 204 Cal. Rptr. 3d 178, 194 (Cal. Ct. App. 3d 2016).
187
Id. at 194–96 (holding that calling the losing candidate a “crook” and
“unscrupulous” attorney was not so far from the truth as to permit a finding of actual
malice).
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the “substantial truth doctrine” courts are called upon to give
the benefit of the doubt to the speaker accused of deception: If
the statement “is ‘substantially’ true in overall effect, minor
inaccuracies or falsities will not create falsity.”188 Liability will
only be found where “‘the substance, the gist, the sting’ of the
communication taken as a whole, is patently false.”189
Judicial elections provide a sort of petri dish for testing
the feasibility of identifying intentional and material falsehood.
A subset of cases suggests that the state may have a compelling
interest in regulating materially misleading statements by
candidates for judicial office and that such regulations may
survive strict scrutiny even when regulations imposed on
candidates for other offices would not.190 States argue that the
integrity of the judicial system—the third branch of
government—itself is at stake. The regulations may be
contained in the state’s code of judicial conduct, which itself
inhibits the robust response that would be entailed in the
traditional admonition to drown out lies with truth, or more
and better speech.191
Judicial elections have not been immune to the scorched
earth tactics exemplified by the Willie Horton ads proRepublican PAC aired during the 1988 presidential campaign,
which falsely accused the Democratic candidate of being
responsible for a program of weekend passes under which a
convicted African American felon committed additional violent
crimes. Taking a page from that approach to campaigning,
Michael Gableman, running for a seat on the highest court in
Wisconsin in 2008, approved a television ad that accused his
opponent of using a legal “loophole” to get the rapist of an 11year-old girl out of prison, allowing him to molest another

188

In re O’Callaghan, 796 S.E.2d 604, 627 (W. Va. 2017) (quoting Turner v. KTRK
Television, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 103, 115 (Tex. 2000)).
189
Id.
190
Callaghan, 796 S.E.2d at 623 (noting that regulations on materially false
statements by judges during elections aim at preserving respect for the judicial system
and have been uniformly upheld); see also Winter v. Woinitzek, 834 F.3d 681, 693
(6th Cir. 2016); Myers v. Thompson, 192 F. Supp. 3d 1129, 1139 (D. Mont. 2016).
But see In re Judicial Campaign Complaint against O’Toole, 24 N.E.3d 1114, 1121
(Ohio 2014) (overturning the portion of the judicial code that barred speech
“conveying true information about the candidate or her opponent” that, though true,
“nonetheless would deceive or mislead a reasonable person”).
191
Callaghan, 796 S.E.2d at 624 (noting that if the code were not upheld, a judicial
candidate would be left with a “Hobson’s choice of leaving false attacks unrequited
or following his or her opponent into the ethical minefield of judicial counterspeech”).
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child.192 Gableman was elected and was sworn in as a justice of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court.193
The state’s Judicial Commission charged Gableman
with violating the state’s Supreme Court rules194 by knowingly
mispresenting a fact concerning an opponent.195 A judicial
conduct panel granted summary judgment to Gableman, and
the matter reached the Wisconsin Supreme Court for review in
2010. The Court’s six justices unanimously rejected
Gableman’s argument that the state’s framework regulating
knowing or reckless falsehoods during judicial campaigns
violated the First Amendment.196
The panel was bitterly divided, however, over whether
Gableman’s advertisement constituted a misrepresentation of
fact. The justices were so divided over a matter involving their
colleague on the bench that the justices who signed Justice
Prosser’s opinion declined to publish their views under the
same citation as the one attached to Chief Justice Abramson’s
opinion, which proposed remanding for a jury trial as to the
meaning of Gableman’s ad.197
The transcript of the television ad read in full:
Unbelievable.
Shadowy
special
interests
supporting Louis Butler are attacking Judge
Michael Gableman. It’s not true!
Judge, District Attorney, Michael Gableman has
committed his life to locking up criminals to keep
families safe—putting child molesters behind bars
for over 100 years.
Louis Butler worked to put criminals on the
street.
Like Reuben Lee Mitchell, who raped an 11year-old girl with learning disabilities. Butler
found a loophole. Mitchell went on to molest
another child.

192

In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gableman, 784 N.W.2d 605, 633–
34 (Wis. 2010).
193
Both candidates were incumbent judges sitting on the state’s lower courts. Any
criticisms they directed toward each other might well have been considered speech
directed at public officials, at the pinnacle of First Amendment protections.
194
WIS. SUP. CT. R. 60.06(03)(c); see also WIS. STAT. § 757.87(3) et seq. (providing
procedures for enforcement and review).
195
Gableman, 784 N.W.2d at 630.
196
Id. at 617, 646–47.
197
Id. at 605.
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Can Wisconsin families feel safe with Louis
Butler on the Supreme Court?
Justice Prosser’s opinion, dispositive because there was
no majority and the opinion below granting summary judgment
to Gableman remained undisturbed, concluded that each
sentence taken in isolation was “objectively true” and immune
to penalty.198 The Prosser opinion treats the disputed text as if it
were a series of tweets spun out over days or weeks that had no
contextual connection to each other. Each sentence, Prosser
concluded, contained facts.
Chief Justice Abramson, in contrast, took the position
that one could not, as the Commission and Justice Prosser did,
“read each of the sentences . . . in isolation, as if the other
sentences did not exist.”199 A myopic focus on literal truth, she
asserted, denudes each sentence of “context or meaning.”200
The message communicated that “Butler’s actions in finding a
‘loophole’ led to Mitchell’s release and his commission of
another crime.” No other reasonable interpretation of the
advertisement has been suggested . . . This message is
objectively false.”201
What did Louis Butler actually do? In the early 1990s,
Butler worked as a public defender and, in that capacity, was
appointed to represent Mitchell. During the appeal of Mitchell’s
criminal conviction, Butler successfully argued that the state
had violated the rape shield law during the trial.202 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court subsequently declared the
evidentiary error harmless, and Mitchell remained in prison
until he was released on parole in the normal course of
events.203 The oral narration to Gableman’s advertisement was
accompanied by written information, including citations to
opinions in Mitchell’s case, which pointedly omitted any
citation to the Wisconsin Supreme Court opinion.204 Mitchell
committed a new offense after his parole. The Judicial Conduct
Panel concluded that: “Nothing that Justice Butler did in the
course of his representation of Mitchell caused, facilitated, or
enabled Mitchell’s release from prison in 1992.”205 Nor did any
aspect of Butler’s representation of Mitchell have “any
198

Id. at 641–44 (defining truth objectively will limit prior restraint, reduce
uncertainty and chill, and will not put the speaker “at the mercy of the hearer’s
understanding”).
199
Id. at 613.
200
Id.
201
Id. at 615.
202
Id. at 612.
203
Id.
204
Id. at 616.
205
Id. at 612.
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connection to Mitchell’s commission of a second sexual assault
of a child.”206
In the absence of a majority opinion, the summary
judgement below vindicating Gableman remained in place. The
Supreme Court had no occasion to consider the appropriate
penalty for knowing misrepresentations, or to ask whether
removal from office could be an appropriate remedy. As this
Article goes to press, Gableman remains on the Wisconsin
Supreme Court; in June of 2017, he announced that he would
not seek reelection in 2018.207
The Gableman story contains a number of cautionary
tales.
First, the liar may be an incumbent, with connections to
decision makers. Imagine how uncomfortable the six justices
on the Wisconsin Supreme Court must have been sitting in
judgment on a colleague with whom they had to work (and
possibly share lunch and coffee with) every day.
Second, the facts were pretty straightforward. The
advertisement wasn’t an impromptu misstatement. Gableman
had the opportunity to consider the text, and he used it.
Moreover, he “virtually conceded” through counsel at the
Judicial Conduct Panel that the advertisement was
“misleading.”208 Even in what seems like a very straightforward
case, it is difficult to obtain consensus on how to distinguish
truth from falsehood. The judges could not even agree about
what methodology to apply.
Third, a regulatory structure designed to sustain the
integrity of the judicial system allowed a misleading
advertisement for a person seeking the highest judicial office to
materially undermine public understanding of the adversary
system by asking voters to hold a lawyer personally responsible
for the later actions of a client he was appointed to zealously
represent.
Chief Justice Abramson concluded that the court’s
deadlock in Gableman—a refusal to even remand the matter for
a jury trial to ascertain whether the advertisement violated the
statute—amounted to an invitation to “future judicial
candidates to push and distort the content of advertising in
judicial campaigns as far past truthful communication as the
creative use of language may allow.”209 If the advertisement,
taken as a whole, did not amount to a straight-out oppositional
206

Id. (quoting Judicial Conduct Panel Findings of Fact # 17).
Michael Gableman, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Michael_Gableman
(last visited Mar. 15, 2018).
208
Gableman, 784 N.W.2d at 616 n.34 (quoting Judicial Conduct Panel, slip op. at 17
(Deininger, J., concurring)).
209
Id. at 614.
207
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lie, it surely was an intentional distortion, or, at a minimum, an
indirect prevarication resting on contextual distortion that was
intended to deceive voters.
The Gableman saga indicates that even if the First
Amendment posed no obstacle to regulating campaign
falsehood, and even if a regulatory scheme survived strict
scrutiny, it might be nigh on impossible for regulators to agree
about where the boundaries lie. If regulation of campaign lies
were constitutionally permissible, which I have argued it is not,
such a statutory or regulatory scheme would hold little promise
of offering a panacea. If straight-out defamatory statements
about opponents in judicial elections are amenable to
regulation, as several decisions suggest, then the normative
message to partisans seems to be: use innuendo with abandon.
V. FACTS AND FICTIONS
I have argued that the First Amendment poses a
virtually insurmountable obstacle to government regulation of
deceptive campaign speech. Above all, freedom of expression
means that the state cannot become the arbiter of truth, even
where misleading statements are nothing more than straight-out
lies. The same holds true no matter where the deception falls
within the taxonomy of campaign lies I have set out. And even
if we assumed for purposes of argument that the government
could punish campaign deception, Gableman demonstrates the
difficulty that would confront government officials asked to
define and identify misleading expression. Instead, it is
incumbent on journalists to ferret out and expose the facts—an
essential aspect of the fourth estate’s contribution to
democracy.
Confronted with cases involving campaign deceptions,
the courts have, almost without exception, reiterated that the
classic First Amendment response to “falsehood and fallacies”
enunciated by Justice Brandeis in 1927 remains an effective
remedy to contemporary lies: “the remedy to be applied is more
speech, not enforced silence.”210 The Alvarez plurality
underscored that the facts in that case demonstrated the power
of “the dynamics of free speech, of counterspeech, of refutation
[to] overcome the lie.”211 Xavier Alvarez was “ridiculed
online,” exposed in the press, and called on to resign, even
210

Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), quoted
in inter alia, United States v. Alvarez 617 F.3d 1198, 1216–17 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d,
567 U.S. 709 (2012); List v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 45 F. Supp. 3d 765, 778 (S.D.
Ohio 2014), aff’d, 814 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2016).
211
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 726 (2012) (plurality opinion).
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before the FBI began to investigate his false claims.212
Channeling Justice Brandeis, the plurality offered succinct
guidance: “The remedy for speech that is false is speech that is
true. This is the ordinary course in a free society. The response
to the unreasoned is the rational; to the uninformed, the
enlightened; to the straight[-]out lie, the simple truth.”213
This response seems particularly appropriate in the
context of an election where, as the Supreme Court explained
in 1982, “a candidate’s factual blunder is unlikely to escape the
notice of, and correction by, the erring candidate’s political
opponent. The preferred First Amendment remedy of ‘more
speech, not enforced silence,’ thus has special force.”214 The
opponent’s accurate correction is expected to prevail in the
marketplace of ideas, at least in theory. State courts also point
to more and better speech as the constitutional remedy to
election falsehoods.215
Granted, none of the election falsehood cases I have
relied on have been decided in the short time since new
information emerged about the scope of disinformation spread
by third parties during the 2016 election cycle.216 In closing, I’d
like to place my analysis of the constitutional limitations on
212

Id. at 727. Once he was known as a liar, Alvarez was investigated for
misappropriating public funds. He was charged, convicted and sentenced to a fiveyear prison term. People v. Alvarez, No. B220044, 2010 WL 3964595, at *1 (Cal. Ct.
App. Oct. 12, 2010) (unpublished).
213
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efforts to regulate deceptive campaign speech more directly in
the context of the fake news that is this Symposium’s focus.
Campaign deception—at least in its most blatant forms
(straight-out lies)—may fit within PEN America’s excellent,
narrow definition of fraudulent news: “demonstrably false
information that is being presented as a factual news report
with the intention to deceive the public,”217 except that the
campaign, not the journalist, puts out false information
intending to deceive.
In the face of Russian trolling and bots on social media
sites, the seemingly widespread collapse of confidence in
traditional sources of information, and allegations of fake news
(all discussed elsewhere in this Symposium issue), some readers
may justifiably wonder whether misleading speech by
candidates and their supporters matters very much in the
scheme of things. Amidst the breakdown of long-held norms,
perhaps analyzing run-of-the-mill campaign deceptions and the
obstacles to regulating them is purely quixotic, a rendering from
a simpler time, about problems that, to draw from a different
context, “Don’t amount to a hill of beans in this crazy
world.”218
As other authors have demonstrated, the universe of
information today and the way in which consumers of
information assess it, has undergone a paradigm shift since the
First Amendment was adopted and since Brandeis formulated
his classic statement about the remedy to be applied to
falsehood and fallacy. Recent events and survey data may seem
to challenge the notion that truth will expose fiction, or that
once voters hear verifiable facts they will weigh those facts in
ways commentators consider appropriate. For example, a 2017
Fox News survey revealed that more respondents (45%) trusted
the Trump administration to “tell the public the truth” than
trusted the reporters who cover the administration (42%).
Another 10% did not trust either. In 1996, 52% of those polled
trusted the media more than the administration, while another
25% trusted both to tell them the truth. Only 9% trusted
“politicians” to tell the truth in 1996; the 2017 survey did not
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ask whether the President is by definition a politician because
he won the office.219
Whether we are actually confronting an epistemic crisis
about the meaning of truth, whether we have lost shared
sources and facts upon which to base debates, and what to do
about shifting cultural norms—such questions are all beyond
the scope of this Article. But while I have argued that the First
Amendment limits the government’s role in responding to
deceptive speech in campaigns (and more broadly to fake news
and the like,) it does not stand in the way of private responses
and solutions, including some of those proposed in these pages.
Real news matters, and truth continues to matter—all
the participants in this Symposium take both of those
statements as foundational principles. Lies campaigns tell
about themselves and about their opponents matter beyond the
immediate electoral context in large part because they
undermine trust in politics and in civic institutions.
It primarily falls to overworked and underfunded
journalists and fact-checkers to expose campaign deceptions.
In the present climate, it is essential for journalists to call out
lies as lies, to present facts that undermine fictions in the same
story, and to reject gestures toward evenhandedness that
amount to false equivalency.
Ultimately, any solution rests in cultural norms that go
far beyond the parameters of this Article. The main burden, as
always, falls on the voter who consumes information. The
efficacy of faith in “more speech” relies on rational educated
citizens. To that end, there are no constitutional barriers to
better education, more transparency about the sources of
information, assertive exposure of lies by private organizations,
and other actions by private individuals and groups aimed at
inoculating citizens and society from the most nefarious
consequences of deception in public discourse.
Most
important, as public discussion of how our society should
respond to this perceived crisis intensifies, we should not
succumb to the temptation to undermine foundational First
Amendment principles that constrain what government itself
can do.
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